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I .  INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II Eastern Europe has been an area of 
cons1derable importance in the Cold War. Captured by the 
Soviet Union in the closing months or the war against Hitler, 
Eastern Europe has remained a symbol of communist expansi onism. 
The area of the world encased by an Iron Curtain has als o  be­
come a reminder of American impotence in the nuclear age .  The 
" captive nations" s eem to cry out for deliverance ,  but the 
United States has not been able to liberate the satellite s .  
Certainly , however, the Soviet Union has had difficulty 
' 
c ontrolling Eastern Europe . The governments of those nations 
can be bent to the will of Moscow, but the minds of the people 
retain a longing for national independence that cannot be curbed. 
Antic ommunism is  not the major element of East European dissent . 
Nationalism i s  the burning flame that hRs led to various types 
of revolt in East Germany, Poland , Hungary , Romania ,  Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia ,  and Albania.  Often the insurrecti ons have 
been led by nationalistic communists . Generally, however, the 
uprisings have failed to eradicate Soviet influence .  
The United States has followed no single , unchanging 
policy toward postwar Eastern Europe .  In 1945 the military 
situation demanded acquiescen�e t o  Soviet control of the region 
1 
2 
between Moscow and Berlin. However ,  the nation's  statesmen 
were unwilling to surrender Eastern Europe without a diplomatic 
struggle, which has now lasted a quarter-century. The first 
postwar policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was 
c ontainment . The Truman-Kennan-Democratic policy was succeeded 
in 1952 by the Eisenhower-Dulles-Republican liberation policy. 
Various frustrated desires were to be satisfi ed by the 
liberation policy. Growing contempt for a seemingly defensive 
policy of c ontainment was replaced by an evangelical , anti­
communist zeal. Fear of internal c ommunism c ould be soothed 
by a program designed to j oust with the Red peril in its own 
habitat . No longer would the world ' s  greatest power be embar­
rassed by an un�xplainable inability to work its will i n  the 
world. 
In Eastern Europe hope of liberation was encouraged by 
the broadcasts from Voice of America and Radio Free Europe . 
It  seemed that the nation which had belatedly entered World War II  
to free Eastern Europe of  Nazi rule was again going t o  provide 
assistance to the natural desire for national independence .  In 
East Berlin in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956 the Amer­
ican promi ses were tested. In each case the pledges were not 
fulfilled. 
When faced with a revolutionary situation in Eastern Europe 
the President of the United States always chose to withhold 
American troops and suppli es . Certainly,  this course of action 
was always taken with deep regret,  but it was taken nonetheless . 
For despite all the anticommuni st and liberation rhetoric ,  the 
J 
national interest of the United States demanded that 
_,.... 
Eastern Europe ��· recognized as a sphere of Soviet influence • 
.... ._::- - .... 
To let Hungary bleed and die alone in November, 1956 , was 
inescapable .  To  let  the Hungarians believe help would c ome 
was unpardonabl e .  
II . EASTERN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 195o•s 
1 .  The "New Course" 
On March 5 ,  1953 , Joseph Stalin died. During his long 
career as totalitarian ruler of the Soviet Union, Stalin had 
accomplished many achievements long s ought by previ ous Russian 
regimes .  One of his most outstanding victories was the 
addition of Eastern Europe to the list of the world ' s  c om.mu-
nist nations . Control of this area brought several advantages 
to the Soviet state . Russian czars had eternally been c oncerned 
about their long and almost indefensible western frontier. 
Particularly distressing until 1 870 was the French danger as 
demonstrated by Napoleon' s  invasion of Russia in 181 2 .  However , 
after 1 870 a new and more menacing force appeared in a united 
Germany. Russia suffered twice  at the hands of this s ource 
before Stalin was able to create the East European buff er states 
after Worll War I I .  1 
The remaining advantages accruing to the Soviet Union due 
t o  the control of Poland , East Germany, Czechoslovakia ,  Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria , Albania,  and Yugoslavia have s omRwhat less 
justi fication and explanati on in Russian history or as defensive 
1 
XX.XII 
Robert F. Byrnes , "East Europe in Crisis , "  Current History, 
( February , 1 957) , 71 . 
4 
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protection .  To the contrary, the Soviet Union also viewed 
such control of Eastern Europe as an offensive weapon in the 
spread of international c ommunism. It gave the Soviets a 
s trong advance base in Central Europe that acted as a 
perpetual threat to Western Europe. Possession of East Germany 
and surrounding territory provided Stalin with an effective 
bargaining position concerning any eventual negotiations for 
the unification of Germany. The Soviet Union also received an 
economic bonus , as it used Eatern Europe as an empire for 
plunder and exploitation. Even the morale of the Soviet rulers 
was improved by the historical indication that communism was 
to be the wave of the future .2 
Military and political c ontrol were of utmost importance 
in this new Soviet empire . Therefore , the economic policy of 
the Soviet Union then, as well as now , was directed toward an 
integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy to assure 
that any future political moves by nationalist East European 
leaders would be tempered by the knowledge of economic dependence 
on the Soviet Union. 3 It was for this purpose that the 1948 
Molotov Plan was adopted. Although a response to the Marshall 
Plan, the purpose of which was to reduce European dependence on 
the United States , the Molotov Plan acted to integrate the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe economically. On January 24 ,  1949 , 
the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) was establi shed in 
Moscow t o :  
2Ibid. 
3Hans J. Morgenthau , Politics Among Nations (New York : 
Alfred A. Knopf , 1969), p .  )1 . 
6 
( ! ) coordinate the economies of the member states ,  
( 2 ) standard1ze their industrial production, 
(J)provide mutual aid through trade , exchange of experienc e ,  and investments , and ( 4 Jdevel op a 
general4plan for economic c oordination of member states . 
The ultimate goal , of course ,  of such a plan was to promote 
specialization in each of the member c ountries  and interde­
pendence among them.5 In fact , it ultimately led to a break-
down in the satellite economies and revolt among their citizens. 
With Stalin' s  death i n  1953 came an almost audible sigh 
of relief from within the Soviet Union and its  empire states . 
Certainly, however, liberalization came much slower . The new 
Soviet rulers were Georgii Malenkov , Nikita Khrushchev , 
Vyacheslav f..lolotov , and Anastas Mikoyan. Astutely realizing 
that only Stalin was capable of holding the Soviet empire 
t ogether by forc e ,  these new leaders desired to establish  
a more durable relationship within the empire . They also 
wished to  reduce the Soviet Union' s  military and economic 
c ommitments . Fortunately, at the same time the improvement of 
the Soviet economy reduced the need for reliance on satellite 
economic assistanc e .  For these reasons was inaugurated the 
more liberal "new course . "6 
The new multiple hierarch.Yfirst pledged c ollective lead-
ership. The fear of a return to one-man rule was made explicit 
in ·Khrushchev ' s February , 1956 , speech to the Twentieth Party 
Congres s .  Political repression was to be relaxed throughout 
4Jan F .  Triska and Robert M .  Slusser , The Theory, Law , 
and Policy of Soviet Treaties ( Stanford , Californi a :  
Stanford University Pre s s ,  1962 ) ,  p .  Jl. 
5rbid.  , P. 246� 
6 Isaac Deutscher , "nThe New S.ovi�tc:: .Policy,;1 ..Toward the Satellite� , "  Reporter ,  ece�er 2 , l ��� , p. 'l� 
7 
the empire , and an immediate reduction of the prison camp 
population was achieved by the release of thousands of political 
pr1soners . 7 Released at this time were many members of the 
clergy, and an even larger number of f ormer party leaders were 
released and rehabilitated. These men who had been imprisoned 
for Titoist views often quickly rose again to positions of 
influence and leadership. 8 Future purges were discouraged by 
the reorganizations and public  criticism of the ubiquit ous secret 
police organizations in each of the satelli t e s .  Hopefully , 
their influence would forever be reduced. The state and c ommu-
nist party were differentiated for the first time as the posi-
tions of  First Secretary of  the Party and Premier were to be 
held by different men. The state was even given a small increase 
1n power ·at th� s3me-:"ttme _.9 I :;party C'ongr@!�SfJS :were· fi�ld·· 1:.n each 
nation as a symbol of the new c ourse ,  but they were generally 
dull and productive of little real change . In 1954 most of the 
nati ons held electi ons to revive the people ' s  waning interest 
in government , although they were not a marked improvement 
over past election travestie s . 1 °  From an economic standpoint 
the Soviets also relaxed control. Promise was made of the end 
of agricultural collectivization, increased production of c on­
sumer goods , and generally higher living standards . 1 1  And by 
7Byrnes , "East Europe , "  p .  72 . 
8Melvin c. Wren, The Course of Russian History · ( New York: 
Macmillan, 1958) , p .  706. 
9navid J .  Da.llin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin 
( New York: Lippincott , 1961), p .  167 .  
1 0Paul E .  Zinner , "Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe , "  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Scienc e ,  
CCCIII (January , 1956), 160 , 161 . 
1 1  Dallin ,  Soviet Foreign Policy, p .  167 .  
8 
December , 1954 , a major satellite goal had been achieved when 
Tito ' s  dream of the disbanding of mixed c ompanies had been 
accomplished in Hungary, Romania ,  Bulgaria,  and East Germany .1 2  
The new Soviet leadership went beyond i nstituti onal 
considerations by als o  seeking to alter the personalities of 
the East European national leaders . They s ought the services 
of good communi st non-Stalinists . They were confronted , how­
ever, with either good Stalinists or non-communists .13  The 
actual rulers of the satellite nations were Stalinists who were 
resistant to any liberalizing changes . They were well aware 
that the communist hold was often weak in their nations . In 
much of Eastern Europe the peasant , who wished to protect his 
small personal landholding , was still dominant in rural areas . 
The old bourgeo1sparties still had a potential following. 
Equally distress ing was that the Social-Democratic tradition 
still pervaded the working class .  With these pockets of 
opposition the Stalinist rulers knew that any relaxation would 
be viewed as a sign of weakness and might well lead to revolt . 14 
The only Eastern European communi st party to really assert 
any independence during this period was that of Hungary, under 
the direction of Imre Nagy. However, his  resignation soon 
followed that of Soviet Premier Malenkov in February , 1955 . 
Malenkov was the leading advocate of the new course within the 
Soviet Union, as Nagy was witltj..n the satellite nations ( excluding 
12 Deutscher , "New Soviet Polley , "  p. 1 8 .  
1 3Da.llin, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 168.  
1 4oeutscher , "New Soviet Polley, "  p.  20 .  
9 
Yugoslavia, of c ourse ) .  Their decline from power preceded a 
gradual deceleration of the new course and a reinstatement of 
harsher economic ,  but not political , policies . However, the · 
liberalization movement did c ontinue at a much slower pace at 
the behest of Nikita Khrushchev . 15 
One definite setback to the new course was the May 1 4 ,  1955, 
Warsaw Treaty of Friendship ,  Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. 
This treaty, adopted as a c ounterweight to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organi zation ,  unified the c ommand of the armed forces 
of the Eastern European nations under the direction of the 
Sovi et Union. A Political Consultative Committee with repre-
sentatives from each nation was set up , but it  was als o  c ontrolled 
by the Soviet Union. Another step in empire integration had been 
taken. 16 
Other examples of the Soviet desire to c ontinue integration 
appeared . Cooperation in broadcasting was evident , and trade 
had increased by late 1955. The c ommunist parties in Eastern 
Europe had also by then safely consolidated their power. Also 
important was the fact that an easing of international tension 
had strengthened the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. 1 7  
Nevertheles s ,  some re:nn�nts of th� new course c ontinued 
to appear after February , 1955. From May 26 to June 2 ,  1955, 
Khrushchev and Mikoyan c onferred with Josip Broz Tito in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Molotov was left in Moscow due to his 
l5Zinner , "Soviet Policies , "  pp . 161 , 162 . 
16Triska and Slusser , Theory, Law, and Policy, p.  240. 
1 7zinner, " Soviet Policies , "  p .  163 .  
1 0  
adamant disapproval of the new course .18 The meeting , held 
at Moscow ' s  initiative , marked the rehabilitati on of Tito 
and the acceptance by Moscow of his claim that there are 
different "national roads to Socialism . "  It  als o  raised the 
Yugoslav leader to grea.t heights of popularity throughout 
Ea stern Europe . Nati onalists in Poland and Hungary were later 
t o  extend his philosophy to its  logical conclusion . 19  
The absolute peak of  post-Stalin liberali zation occurred 
in February , 1956 , at the Twentieth Party Congress meeting i n  
Moscow. Mikoyan opened the c ongress with unexpected references 
to the cruelty of Stalin's  regime . On February 24 and 25 
Khrushchev addressed the congress in a secret session that 
quickly became the talk of Eastern Europe and the world. 
De-Stalinization had begun. Khrushchev criticized Stalin for 
domestic and foreign crime s .  The " cult of the individual" was 
to be abandoned in favor of c ollective leadership.20  More 
important were major doctrinal adjustments and even reversals . 
Official sanction was given to the Tito v.iew of "national roads 
to  Socialism."  It was also declared that internati onal war was 
not inevitable and that therefore c ommunists could use peaceful 
means to attain nati onal rule .  Eastern Europeans were soon guilty 
of the misconception that independent nationali stic regimes 
would be allowed by the Soviet Union. Although c onsi stent with 
Sov�et rhetoric , such an interpretation was not t o  be sustained 
by Soviet action.21  
1 8wren , Course of Russian,  p .  706 . 
19Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. )46 . 
20  John Lukacs , A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday , 1966), pp.  1)0 ,  1Jl . 
21Bvrnes , "East Europe , "  p.  7).  
2 .  Early Resistance 
The death of Joseph Stalin immediately led to hopes of 
s ome East Europeans that Soviet rule would s oon c ome to an end. 
Nationalism,  anticommunism, and Russophobia c ombined to make 
the Soviet presence almost unbearable. The new course , Soviet 
1955 agreement with Tit o ,  and the Twentieth Party Congress 
seemed to indicate that nationali st movements might be tolerated 
in the satellites . Economic hardship and political frustration 
made it  seem necessary that s ome protest be made. Indeed , there 
were four such popular movements in Eastern Europe from 1953 
to 1956 . The first occurred in June , 1953 , in Czechoslovakia ,  
while the second followed i t  by a few days in East Germany. 
These can be considered as immediate reactions to the death of 
Stalin. More s oundly grounded were the uprisings i n  Poland 
and Hungary in 1956. 2 2  
The uprising in Czechoslovakia at the time undoubtedly 
seemed very minor , but from a knowledge of later events it  
becomes a portent of  what was to come. On May J O ,  1953 , the 
Czech government announced a currency reform that would bring 
extreme hardship to the workers .  This theoretically privileged 
class conducted a mass strike and demonstrati on on June 1 
primarily in Pilsen , but also in other Czech cities . No troops 
22  Dallin ,  Soviet Foreign Policy, p .  169.  
11  
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were used, as local police were able t o  squelch the unrest 
before nightfall .  Nevertheless , for the first time Soviet 
authority had been questi oned. 23 
In East Germany on May 28 ,  1953 , the Walter Ulbricht 
regime announced an increase in work norms . Two weeks of 
sporadic demonstrations and strikes persuaded the regime t o  
announce a new course reform program on June 1 2 . Reforms 
c onsisted of the curtailing of farm collectivizati on ,  
relieving farmers from payment of  back taxes , giving small 
businesses back to owners from whom they had been c onfi s cated, 
and a promise of the producti on of more consumer goods . Farmers 
and businessmen might have been mollified by these concessions , 
but the highly organized proletariat was not .24  
On June 16  real trouble began as construct i on workers in 
East Berlin left their jobs to march on government office build­
ings . By the next day their number had risen t o  fifty thousand 
marchers in  East Berlin and thousands more in sixty other 
demonstrati on-plagued cities .  In 129 places Soviet troops 
marched in an ominous manner . In many instances local police 
were unwilling or unable to stop demonstrati ons . Using the 
unrest as a shield , 150  East Berlin police defected to the Wes t .  
Martial law was eventually declared on June 1 7 ,  and Soviet tanks 
and troops were ordered to shoot into the crowd s .  Hundreds were 
killed and thousands wounded as a result of thi s action ,  but all 
23 Ibid . ,  p .  170 .  
24"Military Control in  East Germany ,•  Current History ,  
XXV I  ( June , 1954) , 356 . 
1J 
strikes were effectively curtailed within a few days .2 5  
The scene of the satellite rebellion shifted t o  Poland 
in June , 1 956 . During the three intervening years the most 
important developments were the 1955 detente between the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the 1956 meeting of the 
Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow. Their cumulative effect 
was to give the appearance of a generous loosening of satellite 
restraints . The first attempt to measure the true liberalism 
of the Soviet leadership developed in Poland . 
Two particul�r factors caused the discontent in Poland 
to be so open and widespread. Whereas the leadership of the 
Czech and East German movements in 1953 had been spearheaded 
by industrial workers , the Polish,  and later Hungarian , discon-
tent was best expressed by a liberal , intellectual element . 
In Poland these intellectual leaders were faithful c ommunists 
seeking to merely improve the policies of that party .  Theirs 
was not a revolutionary movement , but rather an attempt t o  
accelerate the new cours e .  The moderation of the me.jority of 
these intellectuals is in direct c ontrast to the si tuation 
that later developed in Hungary. 26 
The Polish explosi on came in Pozan on June 2 8 .  What began 
as an orderly march of strikers under the slogan "Brea.d and 
Freedom" ended in violenc e .  Although the national police force 
and army first refused to fire on the strikers , the casualty 
totals eventually mounted to thrity-eight killed and 270 wounded. 
25nallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 1 74-1 76 . 
26Ghita Ionescu, The Break-Up of the Soviet Empire in 
Eastern Europe ( Baltimore : Pengui n  Books , 1965), p .  61. 
·' 
14 
Such a high number of casualties was extremely unsettling proof 
of widespread disenchantment with the government . 27 The Polish 
c ommunists first blamed the riots on foreign provocateurs , but 
were s oon compelled to admit that legi timate economic problems 
did exi s t .28 Further evidence i s  given of the communist regime ' s  
unstable condition by the fact that the trials of the Poznan 
rebels were held in public beginning on September 2 8 .  Other 
unusual conditions prevailed,  such as permission given the 
accused t o  present a defens e .  I n  this defense the police  were 
openly criticized and economic and political grievances were 
publicly discuss ed . 29 
The Polish  c ommunist party was thoroughly shaken by 
events in Poznan . It w�s realized that a nati onally popular 
leader would have to be placed at the head of the party to 
insure governmental stability.  Populs.r feeling was strongly 
anti-Soviet and anticommunist . The logical course for the 
communi st party was to return popular Polish nati onalist 
Wladyslaw Go�ulka to power. JO October 19 proved to be the 
decisive date .  At a meeting of the Central Committee of the 
Polish United Workers• (Communist ) Party, Gomulka WRS placed on 
the Central Collllllittee , made a member of the Politburo , and given 
27Richard F. Staar , Poland, 1944-1962 : The Sovietization 
of a Captive People ( New Orleans : Louisiana State University 
Pres s ,  1962), p. 98. 
28 Paul E .  Zinner , Revolution i n  Hu;sary 
Columbia University Press ,  1962), p .  20. 
( New York : 
29Byrnes ,  "East Europe , "  p .  
30Hansjakob Stehle ,  "Polish 
Euro e :  Continuit Cha e and 
William E .  Gri ffith Cambridge :  
Technology Press ,  1964) ,  p .  1 01.  
7 3 .  
Communism , "  i n  Communism i n  � 
the Sino-Soviet Dis ute , ed. by 
Massachusetts Institute of 
1 5  
the all-important position o f  party First Secretary. 31 
The Soviet Union was thoroughly outraged by the independent 
action of the Central Committee . On the next day a Soviet 
delegation headed by Nikita Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw . A 
coordinated movement of Soviet troops and tanks t oward that 
city was also begun. The only support for Gomulka was his 
popularity with the Polish people and party. 32 Almost 
miraculously Gomulka avoided military catastrophe . He managed 
to persuade the irate Khrushchev that the s ol e  communist hope 
of maintaining c ontrol of Poland was a drastic liberalization 
program and the acceptance of Gomulka as First Secretary . 
Khrushchev agreed to such nationalism after promises of a 
Soviet-controlled f oreign policy and an early meeting of Polish 
and Soviet leaders in Moscow . 33 
Poland ' s  success seems to have been due largely to the 
fact that change came from within the c ommuni st party. Anti­
Soviet demonstrations were kept at a minimum. A nati onalist  
leader emerged who was acceptable to both his nat i on ' s  people 
and the Soviet leadership .  Gomulka realized fully his  precari ous 
position and successfully maneuvered between the de�ands of the 
two opposing forces . Thus occurred for the first time the 
acceptance by Soviet leaders of peaceful overthrow of a satellite 
regime .34 
JlByrnes ,  "East Europe , "  p.  73.  
3Zibid.  
J3nallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 360, J61 . 
J4Richard Lowenthal , "Revolution Over Eastern 'Europe , "  
Twenti eth Century, December ,  1956 , p .  488. 
J .  The Hungarian Revolution 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 distracted the world ' s  
attention from the less violent uprising i n  Poland. No doubt 
the Hungarian problem contributed t o  the Soviet Uni on' s  moderate 
reaction to the Polish unrest . Hungarians viewed with delight 
the liberalization in Poland and sought t o  use it as a model 
for their own reform program. In this attempt they failed 
disastrously. 
The demands of the Hungarian people cannot be c omprehen­
s ively listed. The people were themselves much divided on what 
they wanted , and demands changed as the revolutionaries became 
bolder or more restrained. There was rather widespread agree­
ment that the first necessity was the total withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from the nation .  I t  was expected that then Hungary and 
the Soviet Union could negotiate all other matters as equals . 
One goal of such negotiati ons would be the withdrawal of Hungary 
from the Warsaw Pac t .  Concerning domestic matters there was a 
desire for the end of communist political monopoly and an early 
reversal of the collectivization policy. 35 
The prevailing discontent reached its  c limax on October 2 3 .  
On that fateful day a demonstration was staged in front of the 
Polish embassy to indicate sympathy with the Gomulka l iberalization 
J5Byrnes ,  •East Europe , "  p .  74. 
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program. Two hundred-thousand people gathered for this demon­
s tration that had an overwhelming amount of popular support . J6 
The meeting was of special importance particularly after it  
had been banned at  one o ' clock in the afternoon. Within two 
hours the government was faced with a fait accompli and gave 
its  approval to the meeting. 37 The demonstration s oon passed 
beyond control . Without leadership it had by 8 : 00 P .  M .  become 
an armed rebellion that marked the peak of the revoluti on. 
After this one show of mass support , the revolt disintegrated 
under pressure into a series of sporadic outbursts by small 
rebel groups with few arms and no organizat1on. J8 The fervor 
o/ these revolutionaries could not ,  however, be deni ed . Many 
were old enough to have fought against and suffered in the 
prisons of both Nazis and c ommunists .39 
The appearance of Soviet troops c onsiderably dampened the 
rebellious spirit .  From October 24 to 27 the revolut i on was 
limited in Budapest to a few isolated incidents. The revolution 
did spread to the c o�ntryside , however, where it  became even 
more anticommunist and anti-Soviet. The communist leadership 
of Hungary appeared entirely incapable of controlling the 
situation. On October 25 the bloodie�t battle occurred in front 
of the government building s .  The secret police fired into a 
demonstration ,  killing and wounding hundreds .  This unfortunate 
J6 Ibid . , p. 77. 
37Pal Jonas , " My Generation : A Pers onal Account of Hungarian 
Youth in Revolt , "  East Europe , VI ( July ,  1957) ,  26. 
J8zinner, Revolution ,  pp. 239 , 249 , 250 ,  259. 
39Jonas , "My Generation , "  p .  1 9 .  
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incident inflamed the resistance and ended any chance of a 
Poland-like compromise . 40 
Realizing that the government must seek to pacify the 
population, recently-rehabilitated Premier Imre Nagy on 
October 25 announced that he was seeking to negotiate the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops .  On October 28 Nagy announced 
his nationalistic program on the radio . 41 He also ordered a 
cease fire after total casualties of 250 dead and 3 , 500 wounded . 
His pronouncement was a capitulation by communism t o  the nation­
alistic desires of the Hungarian peopl e .  42 
October 29 Nagy increased his popularity and improved his 
precarious position as leader of the rebellion by announcing 
that Soviet troops were leaving Budapest . To this stage he had 
succeeded , as  Gomulka before him, i n  balancing popular and Soviet 
demands . October 3 0  ended this balance when Nagy a·inounced the 
formation of a coalition government and the restoration of the 
multiparty system.43 
October 31 was also  an eventful day as Nagy began negotiating 
with the Soviets for a complete withdrawal of their troops from 
Hungary. He used the occasi on also to announce plans to abrogate 
Hungary ' s  part in the Warsaw Treaty. The next day he sent a 
telegram to the United Nations seeking aid as a neutral �ountry. 
This act prompted the remaining Stalini st  c ommuni sts in the 
government to resign. By a gradual process Nagy h&d totally 
broken his �ffiliati on with the party. 44 However , according 
40 Zinner, Revolution ,  pp. 257 , 260 .  
41 8 Ionescu , Break-up , pp. 79 , O. 
42 Zinner, Revolution ,  p .  274 . 
43ronescu, Break-up , p .  81 . 44 Ibid . ,  p. 82. 
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to one Hungarian national i s t ,  Nagy from November 2 to 
November 4 had the absolute and unqualified support of the 
vast majority of the Hungarian peopl e .45 
The major importR.nce of the HungariR.n revolution revolves 
around the decision of the Soviet Union to intervene politically 
and militarily . The s >viet government did stncerely hope to 
avoid vi olence , and as late as October 28 Pravda spoke approvingly 
of Nagy . 46 In fac t ,  as important an official a.s An9.stas Mikoya.n 
opposed to the very end armed intervention in Hungary .47 To be 
sure , Soviet reluctance t o  intervene was not in  any way due to 
moral or ethica.l restraint s .  They thought of their own standing 
among Eastern European nati ons i f  they did not intervene and 
among the neutral nations of the world if they did. The 
October 30 British,  French , and Israeli a.ttack on Egypt undoubtedly 
eased Soviet world-consci ousness s omewhat , although their eventual 
course of action was probably.inevitable . By late October only 
force could be expected to keep Hungary in  the communi st camp. 48 
The actual moment of an irrevocable Soviet decision to 
intervene i s  difficult to determine . As late as October 31 high 
Soviet officials conducted good-natured negotiati ons with the 
Hungarian government . Whether the Soviets were s incere or 
deceitful in these negotiati ons i s  a question that remains 
unanswered .49 One source cites November 1 as the day of deci s i on ,  
basing this conjecture on the proclamation of neutrali ty by Nagy 
45Pal Jonas , "Jozsef Duda: Key Figure i n  the Hungarian 
Revol t , "  East Europe , VI ( September , 1957) , 9 .  
46z1nner, Revoluti on ,  pp .  257 ,  320 .  
47Dall1n, Soviet Foreign Policy, p.  374. 
48zinner, Revolution, p .  323 .  49Ibid . 
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on the previous day. Thi s step apparently went beyond that 
with which the Soviets were willing to compromi se .5° 
On Saturday, November 3 ,  1956 , 200, 000 Soviet soldiers 
and 5 , 000 tanks began an invasion of Hungary. 51 An air attack 
on Budapest was staged the following day. 52 Hungary was totally 
without denfens e .  Its regular army was , of c ourse ,  Sovi etized , 
its people were unarmed, and its  government was paralyzed. 53 
As the best route of escape , thousands of Hungarians fled to 
Austria.  Thousands of  those who remained were shipped to the 
Soviet Union and oblivion. Popular and progressive I�re Nagy 
was deposed and replaced as head of the government by Soviet 
puppet Janos Kadar .54 
5°nall1n, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 373 . 
51wren, Course of Russian, p .  708. 
52Ionescu, Break-up , p .  84.  
53zinner, Revolution ,  p .  JJ6 . 
54Byrnes ,  "East Europe , "  p .  74. 
III .  THE EISENHOWER POLICY TOWARD EAST1mN EUROPE 
1 .  The 19  52 Ca.mpaign 
Just as the Soviet Union was reshaping its policy toward 
Eastern Europe in the early 1950 ' s ,  so also was the policy of 
the United States being criticized and ostensibly altered as 
a result of the 1952 presidential campaign. The new American 
policy, to be known as liberation , was created by a career 
diplomat who had helped implement the c ontainment policy of 
which he became so critical . John Foster Dulles possibly best 
stated his rationale for liberation in his formal resignation 
to President Eisenhower after a fatal cancer had begun to take 
i ts toll . 
I was brought up in the belief that this nation of 
ours wa� not merely a self-serving society but 
founded with a mission t o  help build a world where 
liberty and justice would prevail .  Today that 
concept faces a formidable and ruthlesA challenge 
from international communism. This has made it 
manifestly difficult to adhere steadfastly to our 
national idealism and nati onal mission and at the 
same time avoid the awful castastrophe of war . 55 
Certainly Dulles reflected his view of America's mission 
i n  his 1950 publication War or Peac e .  Dulles was at that time 
but one of many Americans extremely concerned about the seemingly 
total and permanent c ontrol of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. 
55Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Goblent z ,  Du�l At the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power Garden city , New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 22e. 
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He also greatly feared the possibility of further Soviet 
advances.  The Soviet Union s eemed to have an offensive 
momentum that was in no way being countered by the free world. 
The Soviets could maneuver throughout the world without fear 
of American repr1sal s .56 
But an answer seemed to be at hand if  the United States 
possessed the will to utilize i t .  "It is  time to think i n  
terms of taking the offensive i n  the world struggle f or freedom 
and of rolling back the engulfing tide of despotism . "57 
According to Dulles the United States had the means to contact 
the people of Eastern Europe through use of the Voice of America. , 
National Comm�:ttee f or Free Europe and its Radio Free Europe , 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Uni ons .58 
Later experience was to bring use of the radio networks into 
s ome question. 
Actual success was , of CQurse ,  not guaranteed , but Dulles 
did perceive some opportuni ty f or liber&t1on if the proper 
policy were f ollowed . He maintained that the c ommunist system 
was overextended �nd ripe for explosion.  However ,  Dulles was 
careful to  wern against precipitate action. 
"Activation" does not mean armed revolt . The. 
people have no arms , and violent revolt would be 
futile , for it would precipitate massacres • • • •  We 
have no desire to wea.ken the Soviet Union at the 
c ost of the lives of those who are our primary 
concern. 59 
56Ibid . ,  p.  1 65 .  
58Ibid. , p .  249 .  
57Ibid . ,  p .  1 75 .  
59rb1d . ,  p .  247 . 
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A summary of his position revealed a belief that the 
time for action had come. A slight wind would topple the 
c ommunist empire . The United States should provide th9.t wind 
by spreading hope of ev�ntual freedom. Faith in democracy and 
the truth c oncerning the evils of c ommunism were to be the main 
weapons of the liberation arsena1.60 
War or Peace suffered from the usual restricted rea.dership 
of a book devoted to such a topic. The future Secretary of State 
first exposed his evaluation of the world situ8ti on to a popul�r 
audience in the May 1 9 ,  1 952 , edition of Life mqgazine. His 
article , •A Policy of Boldness,"  was to remain a favorite source 
for students of liberation despite editor Emmet John Hughes• 
assertion that it lacked "clarity and substance."61 
Dulles was positive that the most effective and immediate 
action th�t the United States c ould take was to publicly proclaim 
a policy of liberation. 
But liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur 
for a very long time , and courage in neighboring lands 
will not be sustained, unless the United States makes 
it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation 
to occur. The mere statement of that wish and expect­
ation would change , i n  an electrifying way , the mood 
of the jail �rs and create new opportuniti es for 
liberation.62 
Seven specific suggestions were offered to implement the 
l iberation c oncept: 
6 Oibid. , p. 262. 
61 Emmet John Hughes , The Ordeal of Power : A Political 
Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Dell , 1963), p. 62. 
62nulles , " A  Policy , "  p .  1 54 . 
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1 .  The president and congress should announce that the 
independence of Eastern l!:urope is an unalterable goal of 
American foreign policy. No agreement to forsake that goal 
shall ever be made with the Soviet Union. 
2 . Political "task forces" should be developed in the free 
world to create a freedom program for each Eastern European 
nation. 
J .  Escapes from EaRtern Europe should be encouraged, and the 
refugees should be includ?d in task force planning. 
4 .  The Voice of Amert.cs. should coordinate its programs with 
the policies of the task forces. 
5 .  The task forces should be consulted in the planning of 
Uninted States economic ,  commerical , and cultural relations with 
Eastern Europe. 
6. Diplomatic recognition of Eastern European regimes should 
be withdrawn when such action will further the freedom progra:!ls. 
7 .  The United States and the rest of the free world should 
join in publicly proclaiming a "Declaration of Independence" 
for Eastern Europe.63 
In his article Dulles again stressed as he had two years 
earlier in War_££ Peace that liberation was a practical possibility, 
but th�t success could come only through peaceful pressures. 
Suicidal revolts would hurt the cause of liberation. Covert 
resistance, however, c0uld make Soviet control of Eastern Europe 
an unbearable liability to the major communist nation. Dulles 
even asserted that "we can be confident that within two, five 
63Ibid., 154 157 pp. ' • 
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or 1 0  years substantial parts of the present captive world can 
peacefully regain nati onal i ndependence .  That will mark the 
beginning of the end of Soviet despotism's attempt at world 
conquest . "  64 
The timing of the appearance of the Life article was no 
accident . The Republican nati onal convention was fast approach­
i ng and Dulles was the unquestioned choice to write the f oreign 
policy plank of the platform upon which either General 
Dwight D .  Eisenhower or Ohi o  Senator Robert A .  Taft would run . 
In  the platform plank Dulles raised liberation to a new peak 
of optimism. He criticized freely the c ontainment policy which 
he had previously executed. Dulles later claimed th�t he was 
attempting to make the strongest possible case for the Republican 
party without necessarily pers onally agreeing with everything 
he found i t  politically expedient t o  wri t e . 65 
Dulles wrote and the Republican nati onal convention approved : 
• • •  The Government of the United States , under 
Republican leadership ,  will repudiat� all commit­
ments contained in secret understandings such AS 
those of Yalta w!1ich aid Communist enslavements . 
It  will be made clear, on the highest authority 
of the President and the Congress , that United 
States policy,  as one of its peaceful purposes , 
looks happily forward t o  the genuine independence 
of those captive peoples . 
We shall again make liberty into a beacon light 
of hope that will penetrate the dark places .  That 
program will give the Voice of America a real func­
ti ·on. It will mark the end of the negative , futile 
amd immoral policy of "containment" which abandons 
countless human beings to a despoti s� and Godless 
terroris� which in turn enables the rulers to forge 
the captives into a weapon for our destruction. 
64Ibid . ,  �· 157 . 
/' ,.,5 � .Uc:::>rJ.r E(·ller and David Heller, John Foster Dulles : 
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The policies we espouse will revive the conta­
gious, liberating influences which are inherent 
in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains 
and stresses within the captive world which will 
make the rulers impotent to continue in their mon­
strous ways and mark the beginning of their end. 
Our nation will become again the dynamic , moral 
and spiritual force which was the despair of despots 
and the hope of the oppressed • . As we resume this 
historic rol e ,  we ourselves will come t o  enjoy 
·again the reality of peac e ,  security and solvenc y ,  
not the shabby and fleeting counterfeit ggich is the gift of the Administration in power. 
All of Dulles' diplomatic writing was done against a 
background of widespread Republican criticism of President 
Harry s. Truman ' s  postwar foreign policy. Among the most 
prominent in this movement that historian Norman A .  Graebner 
has called "the new isolationism" were Senators William Knowland 
( California ) ,  Joseph McCarthy(Wisconsin ) ,  and Bourke Hickenlooper 
(Iowa ) ,  each of whom called for a complete diplomatic embargo 
with the Soviet Union until Eastern Europe was liberated. 67 
The Republican senators and particularly the vote-conscious 
National Committee grasped liberation eagerly as a means to  
Republican victory in 1952 . 68 
The usual pre-convention maneuvering in the year 1952 
included a Dulles letter to Eisenhower. In April the diplomat 
sent the eventual convention choice an essay on American foreign 
66"Republican Party Platform ," Current History , 
XIII (October , 1952 ) ,  246 , 248. 
�?Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in 
Politics and Foreign Policy Since 195 (New York: Ronald Press , 
1956), p .  148. 
68Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, Vol . XVII of 
The American Secretaries of State and Their Di lomac , ed. by 
Robert H. Ferrell 1 7  vols . ;  New York: Cooper Square , 196 7 ) , 
p.88. 
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policy. Included was Dulle8 ' c oncept of libera.tion.69 
Eisenhower was further exposed to the Dulles doctrine in the 
Republican platform . · There is no doubt that the future president 
was aware of the world view of the man he selected to be his 
chief foreign policy advisor during the campaign and throughout 
most of two terms in office. "In essence ,  however, 
John Foster Dulles did more than advising and assisting. He 
was the key man on most of the f oreign policy issues which 
arose during the Eisenhower administration.n70 A very close 
Eisenhower aide leaves no doubt that major foreign policy 
deci sions were handled primarily by Dulles. " ••• I think that 
the hard and uncompromising line that the United States govern­
ment took toward Soviet Russia and Red China between 1953 and 
the early monthR of 1959 was more a Dulles line than an 
�isenhowar one . "71 
As a result of the Dulles influenc e ,  Eisenhower on August 25  
before an enthusiastic audience at the American Legion Convention 
announced his version of libera.tion.  
The American c onscience can never know peace until 
these people are restored aga in to being masters 
of their own fate . We can never rest--and we must 
so inform all the world , including the Kremlin-­
th�t until the enslaved nRtions of the world have 
in the fullness of freedom the right to choose their 
own paths , that then and then only can we say that 
there i s  a possible way of living peacefully and 
69Ibid . , p .  70. 
?Ozdward Weintal and Charles Bartlett , Facing the Brink : 
An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Scribner's,  
1967)' p. 1 39 .  
71sherman Adams , Firsthand Re ort :  The Stor of the �--��������� ���""'""'"���-Eisenhower Administration New York : Harper and Brothers , 
1 961), p .  87 . 
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permanently w1th c ommunism in the world . 72 
Nevertheles s ,  the Republic�n candidate w�s not totally 
satisfied with his own policy 9romise . Only after considerable 
pressure from the National Committee did Eisenhower profess 
liberati on "by peaceful means . "  The presidential candidate 
was extremely upset by Dulles ' failure t o  use the proper 
c onditi onal phrase in  hi s discussi ons of liberation,  which 
opened Eisenhower to charges of war-mongering . Eisenhower 
later conceded that this instance was one of the few times 
that he ever became angry with the man he always considered a 
great diplomat . 73 
The dangers of liberation left the Republicans vulnerable 
to  varied charges.  Eis enhowers ' s  futile attempts to  curb Dulles 
led to  further embarrassment . As a biographer of Democratic 
opponent Adlai E.  Stevenson later wrot e :  
For his first maj or speech Dulles sold him l];i senhower] 
the idea of a pledge to  roll back Soviet power in 
Europe and "liberate" the satellite countri es , a 
gesture that i ncidentally might also win the votes 
of the many Americans of East European descent . 
When s igns of alarm made him realize  that this 
would mean war , he at once backtracked, saying that 
he had not really meant what he said,  or seemed to  
have said--he would help these unhappy peoples7�nly by peaceful means and would never start a war. 
Certainly the Democrats would not allow t o  go unnoticed 
such an opportunity to flail the Republicans . President 
72Graebner, New I s olationism, pp. 99-100. 
73Gerson, John Foster Dulles , p .  88.  
74Herbert J. Muller, Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values 
( New York: Harper and Row, 1967}, p .  105.  
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Truman accused the Republi can candidate of whom he had earlier 
been so fond of risking war merely to gain votes . Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson characterized liberation as a •positive 
prescription for disaster . " 75 
Primary responsibility for developing a policy to counter 
the Republican liberation talk rested on the shoulders of the 
Democratic presidential candidate and governor of Illinoi s ,  
Adlai E .  StevP-nson. His positive policy had a focus slightly 
different from that of the Republicans .  St�venson's stated 
desire was to create a European and world balance of power in 
which the Uni ted States and Sovi et Uni on could compete i n  
peaceful coexistence. 76 However ,  positive steps could be 
taken i n  rel8tion to Eastern Europe . At Hamtramck ,  Michigan, 
on S"�ptember 1 ,  Stevenson proposed that the United States open 
direct negotiations with the Soviet Union c oncerning the plight 
of Eastern· E'.lrope . This suggestion was in direct contradiction 
with the Republican refusal to deal with the Soviets .  Stevenson 
also suggested a strengthening of the free world so that no more 
nations would fall to c ommunism. He suggested that the United 
Nations be used more effectively i n  the effort to free the 
captive nati ons . Within its  own juri sdiction the United States 
needed to review immigration policy and ta�e other measures 
·75Gerson , John Foster Dulles , · p . 9 0  
76 Kenneth s .  Davis ,  The Politics of Honor: A Bio�raphy 
of Adlai E .  Stevenson ( New York: Putnam , 1 967), p .  28 • 
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77 designed to insure better care for refugees . 
However, the Democratic  candidRte als o  realized the 
necessity of directly challenging the Re publican policy of 
liberat ion. In the Hamtramck speech Governor Stevenson 
pointed out that all Americans looked hopefully to the 
l iberation of Eastern Europe .  But method was of primary 
importanc e .  Particularly distasteful to Stevenson was the 
belief that the Republicans were proclaiming liberation for 
the benefit of the Eastern European nationality groups within 
the United State s ,  r�ther than as a legitimate policy goa1 . 78 
In an Albuquerque speech Stevenson dubbed liberation " a cynical 
and transparent attempt , drenched i n  crocodile tears , to play 
upon the anxieties of foreign nationality groups in this 
country . 11.79 
Stevenson fully exposed his  anti -liberation arguments 
i n  an October Jl speech in Brooklyn as the 1952 campaign neared 
its climax. 
He said, speak "with cold finality" to the Soviet 
Union and prepare to roll back Soviet power and 
liberate the satellite states . How we were t o  
accomplish thi s ,  h e  did not say ; but these word s ,  
spoken on the General ' s  eminent authori ty, rai s ed 
momentary hopes among those Americans whose friends 
or relatives were trapped behind the Iron Curtain. 
As the idea sank in ,  however , the effect was 
greatly di fferent . It  became apparent that the 
General ' s  proposal would lead ,  not to the l iberati on 
of the captive peoples , but t o  their obliterati on--
77Adlai E .  Stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches of 1952 
( New York : Random Hous e ,  1953), pp. 54, 5 5 .  
78rbid . , p .  53 .  
79Graebner, New Is olationism, p .  1 04 .  
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not to releas e ,  but to war . 
Caught out in t'.!i S  manner , the Gen�0al explained 
that he didn ' t  mean what he had sai d .  
80stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches , p .  299 . 
2 .  Administrative Policy 
Part of Adlai Stevenson' s  arsenal was the argument that 
a liberation policy would be v1ewed with much apprehension by 
our European �llies . Such a policy could very easily lead t o  
a European confrontation th�t might well result i n  nuclear 
holocauRt for all of Europe . Stevenson was correct in predi cting 
an allied protest . 81 As la.te a.s 1955 j ournalist Cn".Tlet John Hughes 
found genuine concern that liberation could result i n  di s&st·er • .  
2uropeans generally hoped that Dulles would eventually realize 
the necessity of deqling with the communists through negot1.8t1ons . 82 
Retrospective c onsideration by French leaders revealed no 
agreement on the true American motivat i on for liberation .  
Former Franch Foreign Minister Georges Bidault doubted the 
sincerity of the policy . "Dulles surely never beli �ved in  
rollback from the start . Rollback was buried with the 1 9 5 2  
elect i on campaign in the United States . " 83 Maurice Couve de Yur-ville 
credited the American Secretary of State with both sincerity and 
realism.  "Dulles to the end beli eved in roll ba.ck a.s a moral go$) 1 ,  
but not a s  a m�tter of practice . "84 
The British vi ew of li berati::m W 8. S  suggested by the 
91 nav1s , Politics of aonor , p .  285 .  
82Hughes ,  Ordeal of Power, p .  13�  
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London Economis t  of August JO , 1952 , which wrote ,  "Unhappily 
' liberat i on '  �.pplied to  Eastern Europe--a.nd Asia--means either 
the risk of war or it means nothing • • • •  ' Liberat i on '  entails 
no risk of war only when i t  means nothing . " 85 The London 
Observer was equally critical in a May 1 7 ,  1953 , editorial 
calling l iberation unrealistic . It went on to sug�est that 
the free world must s imply wait for the internal dis integration 
of the Soviet bloc . 86 
Individuals were as cri tic.9.1 of l iber�.ti  on as W.!".s the 
pres s .  British international aff�irs observer Sabastian Haffner 
called radio enc our:agement of reoellion "criminally irresponsible . "  
As early as 1953 Haffner asserted that the United States could 
do nothfng to  be of ·ass istance i f  Eastern Europe did revolt . 
He further believed that the intransigence of American policy 
also eliminated the possibility of fruitful negotiati ons on the 
Eastern Europe�n questi on. 87 Venerable statesman W inston Churchill 
also favored a more conciliatory attitude . "It would , I think , 
be a mistake to  assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet 
Russia unless everything is  s ettled. Piecemeal s olutions of 
individu�l problems should not be di sd�ined or improvidently 
put aside . " 88 
Liberation had been a fine c�mpaign slog�n for the 
Republican party ,  but it appeared that 1 t wonld c�.use very 
85Hans J .  Morgenthau, "John F oster Dulles , 1 953-1959 , "  
i n  An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in 
the 'Nentieth Century, ed. by Norman. A. Graebner (New York: 
McGraw-Bill, 1961), p .  293.  
86Graebner, New Is olationism, p. 194. 
87Ibid . , p .  195. 88Ibid . , p .  194. 
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dangerous p?.rty di sunity w i thin just a few months of 
� i s enhower ' s  inaugurat i on .  Congr e s s i onal Republicans , who 
were working with a Republ i c an pres i dent for the f i r s t  t ime 
i n  twenty yea.rs , saw an opportunity to pass a resolut i on 
s p e c i f i cally c ondemning the Democratic-inspired Yalta , Teheran, 
and Potsde,"!'!l agreements .  They found their party l ee.der willing 
to d i s c laim in only very general language those secret agree­
ments that purportedly resulted in enslave�ent.89 On 
February 2 0 ,  1 9 5 3 ,  the pr e � ident sent m e s P �ges to the Speaker 
of the House and the President of the Senate propo s i ng a 
declaration stating that the United States would not 
accept the status quo in Eastern Europe . 9 0 
The "Captive Peoples Resolution" was subs equently ref erred 
to the House Com.mitteeon Foreign Affairs . Speaking in  its  
behal f , Secretary o f  State Dul l e s  on February 26 t e s t i f i e d  that 
approval of the res olutl�n would revive Eastern European hopes 
of eventual freedom and lead t o  their re j ec t i on of S ovi et 
bondag e . He caut i oned , however , that v i o lent revolt was not 
the goal of the res olut i on .  "This res olution i s  no call to 
bloody and s ens eles s revoluti on .  On the other hand , i t  i s  no 
idl e  g e s ture. n 9 1 A c ombinati on of Republ icans who consid�red -
the resoluti�n to b e  t o o  weak and general and Democrats who 
beli eved it to be dangerously inflammatory succeeded i n  
1953 
89Adams , Firs thand Report , p p .  92,  93. 
90peter V .  Curl , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
( New York: Harper and Brothers , 1 9 54) , p .  1 8 7 .  
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preventing the resolution from being reported out of com.mittee . 92 
Despite the c ongressi onal setback, Dulles in an Apr11 
speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors reaffirmed 
the liberation policy. 
It is  of utmost i�portance that we should make 
clear to the captive peoples that we do not accept 
their captivity as a permanent fact of history . 
If they thought otherwise and became hopeless , we 
would unwittingly have become partners to the 
forging of a hostile power9� o vast that i t  could encompass our destruction.  J 
The significance of Dulles • address was that at the same 
c onvention Eisenhower indicated a willingness to  discuss with 
the Soviets such i ssues as peace ,  disarmament , and United Nations 
supervision of atomic energy. Aide Sherman Adams later called 
i t  the most effective speech of Eisenhower ' s  career and one of 
the highlights of his presidency. 94 Perhaps it was also an 
indication of the differing views of the president and his 
Secretary of State on liberation. Eisenhower i s  quoted as 
commenting privately on Eastern Europe , " I  have always thought 
Foster was a bit too optimistic about changes or upheavals 
there . "95 
The first test of liberation and possibly a product of 
it also w�s the previously di scussed East Berlin upris ing in 
June of 1953 . The American radio station in West Berlin 
�2Ibid . ,  pp.  1 89-191 .  
93Grae�ner, New Is olati onism , p .  147.-
94Adams , Firsthand Report , p .  97 .  
95Hughes , Ordeal of  Power, p .  181 . 
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encouraged the spread of strikes throughout East Germany . 96 
When Soviet tanks appeared to crush the rebellion, it became 
clear that the United States would do nothing to help the 
East Germans . Indeed , the United States did not even have a 
practical plan of action i n  case the l iberation policy did 
encourage a rebellion within Eastern Europe . The extent of 
American aid was to establi sh food kitchens along the 
West Berlin frontier . 97 -
It subsequently became an administration policy to look 
more favorably upon coexistence .  A friendly relationship was 
struck up with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. This revealed a 
willingness to  accept and encourage nationalistic communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe that were not inextricably bound to 
the Soviet Union. Still , however, the ultimate goal was the 
destruction of the Soviet bloc . 98 
The high point of internati onal events in 1955 was the 
Geneva Conference .  Even on thi s topi c ,  however , liberation 
played an important role . Those Republican senators s o  concerned 
with the alleged Democratic crimes of the previous decade again 
demanded that the freeing of &stJ>rn �urope be a primary purpose 
of American participation at Geneva. Secretary of State Dulles 
also encouraged President Eis enhower to stress liberat ion.99 
96 . Walter LaFeber , America, Russia, and the Cold War, 
1945-1966 ,  Vol .  VIII of America in  Crisis , ed.  by 
Robert A .  Divine ( 8  vols . ;  New York : Wiley, 1968 ) ,  p .  1 51 . 
97Drummond and Coblent z ,  Duel At the Brink , p .  79 . 
98 Ibid . , p .  1 52. 
99LaFeber , America .• ,Ru�sia,  p .  1 84 . 
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During May the United States sought to  get the ·Satellite issue 
on the agenda, but was c onsta.ntly opposed by the English and 
French alli e s ,  who , along with many Americans , fee.red that the 
inclusi on of the topic could well scuttle the entire meeting. 
The eventual decis i on to practically ignore the satellites at 
Geneva encouraged extreme and bitter criticism of the meeting 
by right-wing Republicans . 100 
In response to Republican criticism or as a result of 
genuine conviction,  the president stated in January , 1956 : 
" The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, i s ,  
and until success i s  achieved, will c ontinue t o  be a major 
goal of United States foreign policy . "l Ol In May at Baylor 
University he urged Eastern Europe to  "walk fearlessly in the 
fullness of human freedom. "1 02 
I 
-- In October , 1956 , the Secretary of State promised that 
the United States would provide economic aid to any Eastern 
European nation seeking to  break the economic and political 
hold of the Soviet Uni on. He noted that Poland was beginning 
t o  develop a degree of nati onal independence as a result of 
the turmoil there . A c ommunist government in Poland would be 
sati sfactory if  t�e govern�ent were not the tool of the Soviet 
Union. Futhermore , the United States offered to send wheat , 
flour, and other foodstuffs to  Poland through the auspices of 
the International Red Cross . 1 03 
l OOGraebner, New Isolationism ,  pp. 216 , 2 1 7 ,  226 . 
101Ibid . , p .  2)6 .  1 02tbid .  
1 03 U .  S . , Department of State , Background : Highli,hts of 
Foreign Policy Developments-1956 , Pubn. No . 6451 (1 957 , p .  4. 
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/ Such was United States policy on the eve of the Hung�rian 
revolution.  The view of diplom�tic historian, Normen A. Graebner, 
as revea.led in a 1956 puclication provides an interesting and 
critical contemporary assessment of liberation.  
Liberation is  a worthy goal of a free people , 
but the price in  demanding it  as a conditi on of 
peace could be exceedingly costly in  allies , 
goodwill , and confidence among those who expect 
more flexibility and magnanimity in American 
purpos e .  This hard policy toward Russia even 
raises doubt c oncerning the polic y ' s  very morality.  
It is  not clear how the repeated declaration of 
such expectations alone will free the satellites 
or secure German unification. Nor would it be 
easily demonstr�ted that United States mor�l 
preachments were even partially respon�i bT� 1 f:' 
the satellites again achieved their independenc e .  
Tpis nation has obligati ons , futhermore , to seek 
s ome form of reasonable accommodation which might 
strengthen American le�dership and the Grand 
Alliance • • • •  
Any wa.r fought over l iber:.:tion in Europe would 
be difficult to explain in terms of American 
intere�t . The United StAtes has lived with the 
present Soviet empire for a decade without becom-
ing bankrupt or suffering a loss of freedom . I t  
seems reasonable to as sume that the status quo 
could continue indefinitely without injuring this 
nation if  its diplomacy would accept the r�alities  
of  power and possession in the postwar world. The 
time has arrived for the United States to think of 
improved diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 1 04 
Graebner concluded that " • • •  at best l1ber8tion is  a utopian 
goal which creates a commitment far beyond American power to 
achiev e . " 105 .-
104Graebner, 
105 . Ibid . , p .  
New Isolationism , p .  250.  
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I'l .  ADMINISTRATIJN R2SPONSE TO THE REVOLr 
1 .  Administration Reac t i �n 
•r 
·, 
rhe autumn o f  1 9 56 was f i lled with events of tremendous 
internati onal importanc e .  The American presidential campaign 
pitted incumbent Republican E i s enhower against the man he had 
defe�ted four years earl i e r .  The most pr� s s i ng international 
cri s i s  was devel oping_ in the Middle Eas t ,  where 2ritatn �nd 
France were sup�orttng Israeli demands agains t �gypt . In 
Eastern �urope both Poland and Hungary were evidencing a d e s i re 
t o  elude Soviet c ontrol . Hungary finally burst into vi ole·Qce 
o n  Octoc er 2 3 ,  and unt il November 3 it appeared that the 
revolut i o n  might be suc c e s s ful . 
I n  the October stage of the Hungari an revolt , there w�s 
a f 0e ling 1� that nation that help would certainly c ome from 
the United �tat e s  and other Western powers . There s e emed t o  
the Hungarians t o  be no doubt that American8 would ful fill 
their promis es of the l a s t  four years to rush t o  the aid of any 
s a t e l l i t e  breaking from the Soviet gras p .  Speeches that in the 
United Stat�s pas s�d as pol i t i cal oratory were grasped by the 
Hungarians as pledses of support . Nor d i d  the Hungarians 
real i ze , s o  accustomed were they to authoritarian regimes that 
can do exactly as they say , that a democrati c  government often 
speaks for public c onsumpt i on ,  but must act in purely n�ti �nal 
39 
40 
interest .  Furtiicrillort , the Hungarian rebels could not foresee 
the events in the Middle East that were to make impossible even 
tr1e contemplation of unified Western support for t�e insurrection.  
Throughout the Hungarian revolt , American newspapers 
and magazines were to report the disappointment and an�er with 
which Hung�ry ' s  valiant citizens vi ewed American inaction. The 
most formal of t�e requests for �.ld CP.J.me fro::n various groups 
which during the fighting approached the American legation in  
Budapes t .  These requests were pro�ptly relayed t o  the American 
government , which refused to take action on grounds that the 
situ{).tion was to0 unstable to select any group to receive support . 
In other words , the American government refused to back a group 
that might eventually lose power , as h a1 been done i n  China just 
a few years before . Secreta.ry Dulles and President l1;isenhower 
would go no further than asserting that aid might be forthc oming 
if the Nagy government stabilized its  ruling position and upheld 
1 06 the principles it  had e3rl1er proclaimed.  One of the semi-
official requests for aid that was but partially granted was 
Rungarian Cardinal Mindszenty ' s  November 2 appeal for political 
support and reli�f aid. 107 
Hungarian public opinion, which had idoli zed America 
early in  the revolt , by November 2 had turned against tr.e 
United Stat e s .  During the  worst f ighting several foreign 
legations had sent cars throughout Budapest to care for the 
l 06New York Times , November 1 ,  1956 , p .  26 . ::-­
l 07Henry Giniger , "Hindszenty Asks West ' s  Support , "  
New York Times , November J ,  1956 , p .  1 7. 
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women and children. No American car was seen in the streets , 
as the one hundred Americans remained inside the legation.  
Furthermore , all American relief to Hungary was via the 
Internati onal Red Cross and was marked accordingly, causing 
one Hungarian to comment that the United States was the 
" only country that has not come to our aid and has not sent 
relief supplies , blood plasma , and medical equipment . "108 
As the Soviet troops on November 3 began the brutal 
suppress i on of the Hungarian insurrection, rebel radios 
pleaded for the assistance that was the only hope of survival. 
One call for help stressed the reliance on American promi s e s .  
"Where i s  NATO? Where are the Americans? The British? 
The French? We listened to your radios . We believed in 
freedom . There i s  no time now for c onference s  and discussion .  
G ive us arms . Send the bombers . Crush the soviet terror which 
i s  about to end our hard won libert y . "1 09 Another radi o  message 
demonstrated the futile expectation of American aid. "Give us 
a little encouragement . They've just brought a rumor that 
American troops will be here within one or two hours . "1 1 0  But 
American troops never came . 
American policy on Hungary was developed i n  a series of 
private conferences . However, public speeches and acts , as 
well as retrospective memoirs , indicate the nature of those 
conferences . By 1956 the administration's  positi on on liberation 
108r.arry Rue , "U .S .  Failure to Send Aid Irks Hungarians , "  
Chicago Tribune , November 3 ,  1956 , p .  10 .  
l 09Larry Rue , "Tribune Writer Tells Appeals of Hungarians , "  
Chicago Tribune , November 6, 1956 , p .  1 0 .  
1 1 0  "Out o f  Darkness , "  Time , November 12 , 1956 , p .  49 . 
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had changed s omewhat from the 1952 policy. The moral 
platitudes of a party seeking office had been tempered by four 
years of public responsibility. The difficulty of the practical 
application of liberation had been proven in  East Berlin.  
Therefore , communist-hating Secretary of  State Dulles visi ted 
Marshal Tito ' s  Yugoslavia just before the Hungarian crisi s .  
The vis i t  itself and subsequent White  House and State Department 
statements indicate t.ht:it the Eisenhower-Dulles staff had decided 
to accept and even encourstge n�_t1 ona.listic communi sm of the Ti to 
1 1 1  variety i n  EaFtern Europe .  
- Considering the recent Polish upheaval,  certainly the 
Hungarian revolt could not have c ome as a greAt shock to the 
admini stration . During the October days of the revolution ,  the 
American gov�rnment , though generally delighted , responded in a 
very restrained manner in  order not to  substanti at e  ch�..rges that 
the revolt was inspired by the United States . 112 However , a 
source familiar with the pers onalities  of the government ' s  
officials relates that Dulles was enthusiastic in  the belief 
that liberation w�s finally bearing fruit ,  whereas the president 
and most other officials were less hopeful . 113  
However, possibly at � t ime wh�n s ilence would have been 
the best policy , Presi dent Eisenhower in a campaign speech in  
Denver , Colorado , on Saturday , October 2 0  chose to c omment on 
the Eastern European ferment . While promising no assistance , 
he did say, " Our hearts go out to thene [we trus� that they Rt 
1 1 1Lukacs ,  A New History, p .  1 48 .  
112  Ibid . , p. 147 
113  Hughes , Ordeal of  Power, p .  192 . 
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l�st may h�ve that opportunity to live under governments of 
their own choosing . "114 
On Monday , October 2 2  the White House turned its  attention 
to Eastern Europe . According to the president ' s  own count , 
twenty-three conferences were held on that day to determine 
the proper American course of action, presumably both in word 
and deed. 115  It i s  of no li ttle importanc e ,  therefore , that 
the president on the next day, speaking before the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , encouraged 
unrest in Eastern Europe by saying that it  was the duty of the 
United States "to help those freedom-loving peoples who need 
and want and can profitably use our aid they they may advance 
in their ability for self-support and may add 8trength to the 
security and peace of the free world . " l16  
, It wa s not until October 25 that the president i ssued an 
official statement on the Hungarian crisis . President Eisenhower 
first expressed American sympathy f or the people of Hungary, 
who were merely seeking to take freedom and liberty as their 
own. He went on to condemn the Soviet use of force to suppress 
the upris ing , c oncluding that it was now obvious that the 
purpose of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe was to harass the 
populace rather than protecting it from invasl on. 1 17 This  
114Dwight D .  Eisenhower, Wa51ng Peace, 19t6-1961 
( Garden City, New York : Doubleday , 1965), p. O . 
1 1 5rbid. , p .  6 J .  
1 1 6u.s . ,  Department of State ,  Bulletin, November 5 ,  1956 , 
p .  703 . 
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44 
moderRt� ,  official pres idential statement was balanced , however, 
by Vice-Presid ent Nixon' s  political sp�ech i n  Chicag�, where 
he proclaimed that i t  WRS no time to  a.ba.ndon "bold Eisenhower 
decis1 venesc;:" in Easter·., Europe . Nixon further suggested that 
the free world could definitely be of assistance to  East 
Europeans in their struggle ,  although he failed to describe 
the exact nature of that assi stanc e . 1 1 8  
The Friday Washington Post carried a column by Walter Lipp�ann 
that was undoubtedly read by many prominent policy-makers . In a 
very accurate analysis of what was to  be the maj or difference 
i n  the successful Polish uprising and the bloody Huhgariah 
i nsurrection, the respected columnist expressed h i s  hope th�t 
the East ern Europe�.n revoluti ons would be controlled by n·ati on­
' 
ali stic communi sts rather than becoming anticommunis t .  Lippmann 
prophetically stated th�t anticommunism "could lea.d to bloody 
deeds in which we would be c�.lled upon to  intervene , our honor 
being involved , though we could not intervene , knowing the.t the 
ri sks were incalculable . " 119 
That same morning at 9 : 00 A . M .  the Nati onal Security Council 
met for two hours to  discuss the rapidly deteri orating situation 
i n  Hungary. Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency was 
among the more hopeful , predicting that the Soviet acti on i n  
Eastern Europe might l ead to  an immediate Sino-Soviet split .  
1 18 Carroll Kilpatrick , "Nixon Says Free World Can Help 
East curope , "  Washington Post and Times Herald, October 2 6 ,  1956 , 
p .  Al . 
l l 9walter Lippmann , "How Far i n  Eastern Europe , "  Washington 
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The president WRS very fearful , however , tha t the satelli te 
crisis  wes becoming so serious for the Sov i ets that they might 
resort to an intern� ti onal war to stabilize the situation in  
their own bloc . This fear was to dictate American policy for 
the next few days . At the Nati onal Security Council meeting 
Eisenhower directed that a paper be prepared on possible 
altern2tive courses of action. Its suggesti ons , which were 
followed precisely , were to as sure the Soviet authorities that 
the United States had no desire to have allies in Eastern Europe 
and to support whatever action might be taken by the United 
Nati ons . 120  
On October 27  the Washington Post reported that the 
United States diplomats with whom it had c onsulted shared 
Lippmann' s  fear that an anticommunist revolt would result in  
certain violenc e .  They were also concerned with the posi t i on 
of their nation in the crisi s .  It seemed necessary and �roper 
that at least 1moral supporJ be given the Hungarians , but there 
was much anxiety that even this trifling ge�ture would result 
in charges that the United States had provoked the rebellion. 121 
On the same day Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy 
called Tibor Zador , First Secretary of the Hungarian legation 
int o his  office .  The official purpose of the meeting was to 
protest the fact thet c ontact between the American government 
120iisenhower, Waging Peace , pp. 67-68 . 
121 chalmers M .  Robert s ,  R U . S .  Confers on Possible U . N . 
Action in Hungary , "  Washington Post and Times Herald, 
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46 
and its  representative in Hungary had been temporarily 
terminated. Murphy went on to  express concern f or the 
Hungarian people and sugg�sted the possibility of Red Cross 
aid.  Zador replied that the ri ot ha.d been a small affair 
started by students ,  but later taken over by fascists.  He 
further st�ted that the Hungarians had welcomed Sovi et inter­
vention under the auspices of the Warsaw Pac t . 122 
On the night of October 27  the Secretary of State made 
a. major address before the Dallas Council on World Affairs . 
Dulles proclaimed that recent developments in Poland and Hungary 
proved the weakness of Soviet imperialism. He promised American 
economic support t o  those captive nations thqt broke from the 
Soviet hold. Furthermore , this assistance was not to be denied 
to those nations that merely adopted a nati onalistic brand of 
communi sm. The Secretary pledged "that those who now die for 
fraedom will not have died in vain" and that American respon­
sibility would be fulfilled through the United Nations . 123 -
On October 28 the Secretary of State announced that the 
United States would offer Red Cross aid to Hungary .1 24 More 
ominous news came from the ranking Uni ted States diplomat in 
Budapest.  Counselor Spencer Barnes notified Washington that 
a.11 Americans in Hungs.ry had been gathered into the legation 
building for protection. Barnes also stated that he was 
considering sending all Americans out of the country. 125 This  
1 22u. s . ,  Department of State ,  Bulletin, November 5 ,  1956 , 
p .  701 . 
123 Ibid . ,  p .  697. 124Ibid . ,  p .  700.  
1 25chicago Tribune , October 29 , 1956 ,  p.  5 .  
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wa� to be the first ins tallment of a lengthy dispute conc�rnin� 
the s:ifety of the A.m�ri c ans in Hungary . On November 2 a convoy 
of Amcric8ns f i nally began the trip to the Austrian border. 
However , they were stopped there anJ esc orted back to Budapest 
by Soviet troops . Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy pro-
1 2 6  t es t ed vigorously to  Soviet Ambassador Georgi N .  Zaroubin . 
The Amcri c�n convoy started again on November } ,  but it  was 
again ordered t o  return t o  Budap e s t . This time , however, there 
were promi s e s  that the convoy would eventually be 81lowed to 
l eave the nat i o n . 1 2 7  It was not until Novembe r 5 th�t th� 
ma j ority of Americ'1.ns were finally allowed to go from Hungary 
t o  Aus tri a .  S o  ended one minor drama of  the Hungari�n upr 1 s ing . 1 2 B  
By the time Secr�t�ry Dulles had begun talking ab�ut 
a i d  ins Hungfl.ry through the Red Cross , it had bec o me quite obv i ous 
to many America.n� that their government w�s going to do  nothing 
of a political or military nature in support of the freedom 
fighters . Consequently , some felt it  necessary t o make person�.l , 
symbolic gestures of support . On October 28 thr�e alien 
Hungarian� were arrested in New York City for throwing bottles 
at the headquart�rs of the Soviet delegation to the Uni t ed NRtions . 
On the same day five hundred orderly pickets filed around t h e  
Whi te House ,  but were prevented from I!l.a.rc�1ing t o the Russian 
embassy . Ameri c a n  public  opinion was beginning to  express itsel r . 1 2? 
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The next day in Chicago f i fteen hundred Hungarians were 
allowed t o  march through the busy Loop even though they l acked 
a parade permi t .  The eymip•t.}l}.�-t,fc; Chicago police chose t o  allow 
the illegal march as l ong as demonstrators stayed on the . · - · 
sidewalks • 1 3°· 
- The Hungarian revolution did not come in a vacuum . 
Indeed, i t  came at a time of great internati onal activity. 
The Suez cri sis had developed al ong with the Hungarian s i tuation 
and burst forth in vi olence on October 2 9 .  Of equal import 
domestically was the c onduct of the 1956 presidential campaign. 
Although a major i ssue in 19 52 , liberation had been little 
discussed in the 1 956 campaign until its final days . The 
platforms of both major polit ical parties 1t&t� support for 
liberat ion, but the candidates for the highest �ffice i n  the 
land avoided the volatile topic as l ong as pos sibl e . 1 31 
Republican aides and Secretary Dulles were not s o  caut i ous , 
however. During the earl y ,  enc ourag ing ·da.ys of the Hungarian 
, .  
revolt , nany Republican campaigners called the recent East ern 
European developments a result of Republican liberation strategy. 
When the insurrection turned into disaster, the Republ icans 
would ad�it no responsibility, howev er , and warned the American 
people that only the antic ommunis t ,  mili tarily-experienced 
Dwight D. Eis enhower c ould adequately s erve the American people 
as president during this crisi s . 1 J2�Eve.n Democrat& wer� subject 
I 
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to undue optimism. Candidate Adlai Stevenson in a Bos ton 
speech of October 29 re joiced at the news from Pol�nd and 
Hungary. 133 Senator James O .  Eastla.nd ( D-Mi s s 1s sippi ) 
unsurprisingly lauded the revoluti onary efforts . He even 
suggested immediate United States action, although of a 
limited nature . "This i s  a great moment and one for the 
United States to flash its leadership . I fervently express 
the hope that the President of the United States will strive 
to galvanize the United Nations into immediate and forthright 
action . "  134 '· 
i .._ Monday , October 29 was also a day of campaigning for the 
president . However, he did find time to send a message to the 
Soviet Union ' s  Nikita Khrushchev . Eisenhower requested that 
the Soviets allow the satellite nati ons to pursue their own 
independent course .  But the message was couched in terms 
designed to insure that it  would not be considered a provocation 
of rebellion. Indeed,  the liberating president assured the 
Soviet Union that the United States "has no ulterior purpose 
i n  desiring the independence of the satellite countries • • • •  We 
do not look upon these nations as potential military alli es . " 135 -= 
More militant talk came on the next day , however, from 
a closed meeting of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.  
As  there was much newspaper talk of a possible Roma.�1iz..n revolt , 
lJJcharles A .  H .  Thomson ani Frances M .  Shattuck, The lt56 
Presidential Campaign (Washington: Brookings Institution ,  19\0),  
P • 303 . 
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the c oillmittee had invited Mihail Farcasanu , the former l eader 
of the Romanian underground , to t e s t i fy . The substance of h i s  
t e s t i mony was not l ong a secre t .  He sugge sted that the United 
States break diplomatic relati ons with Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union and recognize exile g overnments . Farcasanu claimed 
that Romania would revolt if assured of Amer i c an support . And 
to the nations of East ern Europ e ,  American policy on Hungary 
would be deci s i ve . " I f  there i s  no help , hope will d i e  behind 
the iron c�rtai n . " 1 36 
But a much more enc ouraging development t han Farasanu ' s  
t e s t i mony dominated the news of October 3 0 .  For o n  that day 
was i ssued the "Declarati on by the Government of the USSR on 
the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of 
Friendship and Cooperation Between the Sovi et Union and Other 
S o c i a l i s t  State s . "  No adequate explanati on can be offered from 
t h i s  s ide of the Iron Curtain for the October JO declarat i on .  
Pos s i bly the Soviet leaders were t otally s incere . Poss ibly the 
doves were temporarily dominant i n  the making of foreign policy . 
Poss ibly the stat ement was & devious camouflage of planned 
military act i o n .  Whatever t h e  c as e ,  t h i s  vital document of 
S 0 v i et strategy was immediately proclaimed i n  the W e s t  and i n  
Eastern Europe as a v i c t ory for self -det erminat i o n .  I t  said 
that " s oc i al i s t  nati ons can build their mutual relations only 
on the principles of c omplete �quality , of respect for territorial 
integrity , state independence and sovereignty, and of noninter-
1J6w i l liam F.dwards , "Chain Uprising Pos s i bi l i t i e s  Told 
Probers , .. Chicago Tribune , October 31 , 1 9 56 , p .  4 .  
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fercnce i n  one another ' s  int �rnal e.ffairs . " 1 3 7  Normally such 
a s tat ement would have be�n dismi s s ed as propaganda, but c oming 
at such a crucial time i t  was viewed as a momentous conces si o n .  
The Sovi et leaders admitted past � i s takes and recognized national 
d i fferences . While regretting the presence of "Qlack reaction 
and counterrevolution" i n  Hung�ry , the S ov i e t s  did pledge to 
negotiate the question of the presence of the Red Army i n  
Hunzary w i t h  the proper Hungarian authori t i e s . H 0 s t  important , 
" • • •  the Soviet g overnment has given i t s  mili tary c ommand 
instructions to w i t hdraw the S ov i e t  mili tary uni t s  from the 
c i ty of Buda p e s t  as s o on a s  this is c onsidered n ec e s s ary by 
the Hungarian g overnment . " 1 3 8  I t  appeared t o  many that the 
Hungarian cri s i s  had ended w i t h  a brilliant victory for that 
s truggling nat i on .  
In response t o  the Soviet s t atement of poli cy , the Nagy 
g overnment immediately requested the negotiated withdrawal of 
S ov i et troops from Hungary. Na.gy went on to indicate the 
possibility of Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pac t . 1 39 
Response i n  the United States was equally opt i mi st i c . The 
Washington Post on November 1 described the reception of the 
Soviet statement by American diplomat s . "Events i n  Hungary , 
observers here bel i e ·' e ,  may have shown the Ru� s i ans the d i f f iculty 
of trying t o  use large-scale force against a full-scale revolt , 
l 3 7Paul E .  Zinner , e d . , National C ommunism a.nd Popular 
Revolt i n  Eastern Europe ( New York : C olumbia University Pre s s , 
19 56 ) ' p • 48 5 • 
l 38!J2.ig . , p .  488 . 
l 39Eli e  Abel , " Hungary CP. lls on Russians t o  Discuss Troop 
�xit Now , "  New York Times , Nov ember 1 ,  1 9 56 , p .  1 . 
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and yet try to preserv� the fiction 0f 'democracy ' bt!'!'hind the 
Iron Curtaln . " 140 
- The night of October Jl President Eisenhower spoke on 
nati onal radio and television .  Although primarily devoted to 
the Suez crisis , the address was also used as the official 
American response to the Soviet declaration. The president 
expressed hope that a dramatic change was finally to  come in 
the status of  Eastern Europe , a change for which the free world 
had waited s ince World War I I .  He repeated the offer of econoQ1C 
a.id to the new governments of independent Eastern European nati ons 
and again made clear that the offer was not c ontingent upon the 
adoption of any particular form of government . Eisenhower also 
reiterated his pledge to the Soviet Union that the United States 
would seek no military allies in Eastern Europe . 141 Senator 
W illiam E .  Jenner(R-Indiana ) and historian John Lukacs are among 
the many critics who maintain that this final pledge assured 
the Soviets a free hand in Eastern Europe . It is  also pointed 
out that no c oncess i ons were offered concerning American troop 
strength in Western Europe . 14� 
November 1 brought some ominous signs to  curb the optimism 
of the previous day. Nagy declared Hungary neutral and withdrew 
his nation from the Warsaw Pact , while at the same time seeking 
140Murrey Marder , " U . S .  Diplomats See Possible Soviet Policy 
Switch , "  Washington Post and Times Herald, November 1 ,  1956 , p .  A? . 
141u.s . ,  Department of State , Bulletin, November 12 , 1956 , 
p .  744. 
142 85th Cong . ,  1st sess . ,  March 2 1 ,  195 7 ,  Congressional 
Record, CII I ,  412 and Lukacs ,  A New History, p .  149 . 
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United Nations protection. The evil  omen was the reinforcement 
of Russian troops la Hungary and the movement of Soviet tanks 
to the perimeter of 3udapest . 14J In a campaign speech for 
Eisenhower , former Republican presidential candidate 
Thomas E .  Dewey , perhaps not totally informed of th e events 
of the day , proclaimed the Dulles liberation policy an important 
success . 144 The better-informed Eisenhower , at his last platform 
speech of the campaign in Phil&delphia, warned of possible Soviet 
reprisals in Eastern Europe . The incumbent pledged that the 
United States would refrain from the use of force in the inter-
national crisis and would inste&d support any action taken by 
the United Nations . 145 
November 2 was the lull before the storm. President 
�isenhower authorized the expenditure of twenty million dollars 
in c ongressional emergency funds for Hungarian reli e r . 146 An 
embarras sing oversight was als o  c orrected , although the damage 
had already been done . The United States found itself in the 
awkward position of having no amb�ssador in Hung�ry at the 
crucial time . of Hungarian revolt . Ambassador Christian M .  Ravndal 
had left in July for his new appointment in  Ecuador . Hi s 
replacement , Edward T .  Wailes , was the :unbassador to the 
Union of South Africa when he learned of his new appointment . 
However ,  no urgency was assigned to the Budapest pos t .  
143John MacCormac ,  "Soviet Tanks Again Ring Budapest ; Nagy 
in Appeal to UN , "  New York Times , November 2 ,  1956 , p .  1 .  
144New York Time s ,  November 2 , 1956 , p .  1 9 .  
145rbid . , p .  1 8 .  
1 46Eis enhower, Waging Peac e ,  p .  84.  
Cons equently ,  Wailes did not arrive in Hungary until November 2 
and even then had not been briefed on h i s  new assignment . Such 
negligence led t o  considerable c ongre s s i onal criticism of the 
State Department and American intelligence agencies during the 
next few months . 1 47 
Never had the American State Department been under such 
s tress s i nce World War I I .  The combined impact of the Suez and 
Hungarian cris e s  was enough to tire any dipl omat . Compounding 
the confusion was the presidential campaign, which was nearing 
i t s  conclu s i on .  On November 3 an already overburdened president 
and State Department received a further t e s t  when Secretary of 
State Dulles was taken to Walter Reed Army Hospital f or t h e  
emergency removal of a portion o f  c ancerous i nt estine . Although 
the Secretary recovered with amazing speed , h e  was hardly off 
the operating table when the Soviet Union finally moved t o  
irrevocably crush the Hungarian upr i s i ng .  During this fateful 
period f oreign policy was i n  the hands of the president and 
Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr . 1 48 
November 3 a l s o  witnessed the first stage of the ultimate 
S ov i e t  suppres s i on of the Hungarian insurrection. State Depart­
ment officials rushed to their offices when the United States 
legation in Budapest reported the rapidly changing situation. 149 
1 47Robert Murphy, Di!l omat Among Narriors ( Garden C it y ,  
New York: Doubleday , 1 964 , p .  428 and New York Time s ,  
November 1 ,  1 9 56 , p .  2 7 .  
148" ' Take Care o f  My Boy , ' "  Time , November 1 2 ,  1 9 56 , p .  1 7 .  
1 49New York Time s , November 4 , 1 9 56 , p .  34 . 
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After meeting with his  top advisors and even conferring with 
Secretary Dulles Bt Walter Reed, the president sent an urgent 
pers onal message to Premier Nikol�i A.  Bulganin .  Eisenhower 
mentioned with approval the October 30 Soviet statement and 
expressed concern that its sentiments had apparently been 
!:!ba.ndoned. He appealed particularly for the So,ri ets to withdraw 
their troops from Hung�ry . 150 President Eisenhower then issued 
a public statement declaring American objectives t o  be the witn-
drawal of Sovi et troops and the restoration of self-deter�inati on 
t o  Hun�ary. It als �  became known that the administration had 
rejected su�gestions of a military demonstration of power. 151 
The most recent Soviet initiative also  became an important 
political issue . Vice-President Nixon utili zed most effectively 
the shift of strategy that required the Republic�ns to cease 
speaking of Hungary as a party victory and start using i t  a s  
an ex�mple of the treachery of the Soviet Union, which demanded. 
152 
8 military president . The Democr�ts , who would seem to have 
had the better of the pos1 tions on Hunga.ry ,  ineff�cti vely cha.re;�d 
the Ei senhower administration with responsibility for Soviet 
boldness.  Nrs . Eleanor Roosevelt accused the administration 
of wasting precious time �t the United N�tions and of deceiving 
the American public on the actual state of foreign affairs . 
But she thought the latter error might be explained . "It  s eems 
l50u . s . ,  Department of St�te , �ulletin, November 1 9 ,  1956 , 
p .  796 . 
151 nana AdRms Schmidt , "Eisenhower Sees His Top Advisers , " 
New York Times , blo1rember 5 ,  1956 , pp. 1 ,  2J .  
152 Thomson and Sh�ttuck , 1956 Presidential Campaign , p .  308. 
very difficult for the President of the United States to  tell 
us just what the situ�tion is . I wonder sometimes whether he 
really knows . " 153  Presidential c1ndidate Adlai Stevenson in 
reference to  both Hungary and Sue7. said , " I  doubt if ever oefore 
in our diplomatic history has any policy been such an abysmal , 
such a complete and such a cat�strophic failure . " 1 54 Stevenson 
even suggested that the United States government aad hindered 
efforts to  assist Hungary. " Fumbling and uncertain , the 
Eisenhower Administration even delayed the efforts of other 
nations to help the people of Hungary in the United Nations. 11 1 55 
Vice-Presidential candidate Estes Kefauver was critical of 
Eisenhower for failure to put into practice the "boastful and 
hollow talk • • •  about liberating the satellite countries . " 1 56 
But the Democrats could offer no effective course of action 
in Hungary and c ould hope only to embarrass the administration. 
� By Nov�mber 5 the horror of Hungary had been recognized 
throughout the United States. Senator William Knowland suggested 
the organization of an international volunt�er force to fight 
in Hungary. He further recommended that the United Nations 
expel Russia , the free world end diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union , and free nations terminate all economic relati ons 
with the Soviet bloc . 1 57 Monsignor Bela Varga, president of the 
l53Richard Amper, "Kefauver Calls U . S .  Policy ' Blin� , ' "  
New York Times , November 5 ,  1 9 5 6 ,  p.  )4 • 
. 
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Hungarian Nati onal Council , perhaps typified Hungari21.n exile 
thought when he called on the president to call an emergency 
s ession of congress to  impose sanctions against the Soviet 
Uni on. He was also extremely critical of the administration 
f or failing to supply arms to his native c ountry . 158 
.....  � .. Editorial response to  the most recent events in Hungary 
unanimously prai sed the fight for freedom , but with equal 
enthusiasm rej ected the possibility of American i ntervention. 
Life magazine asserted that both political parties were surprised 
by and unprepared for the developments in Eastern Europe , but 
i t  added , " Much more c ould have and should have been done . But 
most critics of U.S . government inaction ,  faced with the pay-off 
decision of whether to use the American GI for liberation, would 
have also shied away. The Russi�ns know our dil$mma only too 
wel l . "159 The Washington Pos t ,  in  an editorial titled " Long 
Live Hungary! , " apologized for Western inaction. However , the 
Post maintained that any action other than that of the United 
Nations might risk nuclear war . Part of the fault was attributed 
t o  the Hung�ria.ns , who allegedly did not know when to restrain 
their revoluti onary ardor . 160 The prestigous New York Times 
was primarily interested in castigating the Soviet Union.  "We 
accuse it of having committed s o  monstrous a crime against the 
Hungarian people yesterday that its infa,my ca.n never be f orgiven 
1 58New York Times , Nov&mber 6 , 19 56 , p .  2 8 .  
1 59"The U . S .  and the Rebelling s�tellites , "  Life , 
November 5 ,  1 956 , p .  5J . 
160wash1ngton Post a.nd Times Herald, November 5 ,  1 956 , 
f>.  A14. 
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or forgotten. n 161  -
The most disturbing development on November 5 was a letter 
to President Eisenhower from Premier Bulganin suggesting that 
the ti\to roost powerful nations in the world combine their mill tary 
f orces to crush the British-French-Isr�eli forces in Egypt. 
Certainly an unacceptable answer to Eisenhower ' s  message of 
November J ,  Bulgani n ' s  letter was accorded an immediate public 
reply from the White House .  The American president shifted 
scenes when he sai d :  " • • •  it  is  clear that the first �nd most 
important step that should be t�ken to insure world peace and 
s ecurity is  for the Soviet Union to observe the United Nations 
resolution to cease its military repression of the Hung�r1an 
people and withdraw its troops . "1 62 
Throughout the Hungarian crisis , Austria had played a 
ma j or role as the exit for disenchanted Hungarians and the 
entrance for relief and armed support . Not unaware of the 
situati on ,  the Soviet Union threatened to enter Austria to 
crush those groups supporting the freedom fighters . On 
November 6 the United States Department of State responded to 
this threat to world peace oy warning the Soviets against such 
action. 16J 
The drama , however ,  was fast approaching its c onclusi on.  
On November 8 the New York Times reported th�t the Hungarian 
161New York Times , November 5� 1956 , p .  JO.  
162u.s . ,  Department of State , Bulletin, November 1 9 ,  1956 , 
p .  796 . 
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revolution had been completely crushed. 164 But many Americans 
were not willing to concede defeat . That evening ten thousand 
people filled Madison Square Garden with chants of "We want 
action" at a rally spons ored by the Internati onal Rescue 
Committee . Governor Averill Harriman(D-New York) and Senator 
Clifford Case ( R-New Jersey)  appealed for relief funds . The 
speech of Anna Kethly, the Nagy government ' s  unrecognized 
representative at the United Nations , was interrupted by shouts 
Of derision When sne advocated peaceful coexi stence . 165 
" ' 
'-- A constant criticism of American policy as it  related to \ 
Hungary was that the United States had encouraged the suic idal 
revolt by its policy of liberation and by inflammatory radio 
broadcasts . Adding fuel to the flame was the resignation in  
November of United States Information Agency director 
Theodore Streipert . 166 So seriously did the a.dministration 
c onsider the charges of inciting to riot t�at the president i n  
a November 1 4  news conference speci fically repudiated such 
accusations . Eisenhower maintit.ined th•t the United States had 
merely encouraged Eastern Europe to sustain the hope of freedom, 
but had never encouraged the defenseless citizens to sta.ge hope­
less armed revolt . 167  
l64Eli e  Abel ,  "Soviet Units Win Budapest Battle ; Resistance 
Ends , "  New York Time s ,  November 8 ,  1956 , p .  1 .  
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. 
l6611Man in Charge , "  Time , November 19 , 1956 , p .  2 2 .  
167Paul E .  Zinner, 
. 
ed . ,  Documents on America.n Foreign 
Relations, 1956 ( New York: Harper and Brothers , 1957), p .  261 . 
60 
On November 24 Senator William E .  Jenner announced his 
dismay at the lack of a positive United States response to the 
Hungarian calls for assistance . , He went on to endorse the 
sancti ons against the Soviet Union suggested earlier by Senator 
Knowland . Two days later the senator from California added two 
points to his proposed program. He requested that the United 
Nations instruct international business and labor organizations 
t o  refrain from dealing in  goods produced by the Soviet bloc . 
A further suggestion was that a. permanent United Nations milit�ry 
f orce be established that would be capable of acting within 
twenty-four hours of the development of a crisis . 168 In scc ord-
ance with Knowland ' s  suggesti ons , the American Veterans Committee 
requested longshoremen to refuse to unload Soviet ships . It  Plso 
ur3ed the American Federation of Labor-Congres s  of Industrial 
Organization to persu�de the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions to make the boycott worldwide . 169 
'� Although the Hungarian crisis was over by mid-November, 
it had c ontinuing repercussions . On December 4 and 5 ,  for 
instance , pe�ceful demonstrators in Budapest marched before 
the American legation protesting American inaction at the 
monent of Hungarian need. The protesters were kept out of the 
building by the intervention of Soviet tanks . 170 
Vice-President Nixon delivered a major address to the 
l68"Hungary , "  Coltres si onal Quarterly Weekly· Report ,  
November 30 ,  1956 , p .  1 02 . 
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Automobile f·i�nufacturers Ass ociation in  New York City on 
December 6 .  In that address he indicated the administration's  
thoughtful response to  the Hungarian crisi s .  The vice-president 
first explained America ' s  action: 
'rhe United Nations has no armies that it could 
s end to rescue the heroic freedom fighters of 
Hungary. There were..:.no treaties which would 
invoke the armed assist�nce or the free nations . 
Our only weapon here was moral condemnation, 
since  the alternative was action on our part 
which might initiate the third and ultimate 
world war. 171  
But Nixon refused to abandon the liberation policy. "We must 
offer every assi stance and enc ouragement to the peaceful liberation 
of enslaved peoples . " 172 
The entire Atl�ntic community w�s , of cours e ,  shaken by 
the show of Russian force in Hungary. This �·:-ould have been 
discuss �d much more seriously , except that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization was most intent on struggling with the 
divisive Suez crisis . A meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in  Paris during December led Secreta.ry of State Dulles , by now 
recovered from his  recent operation ,  to assess the relati onship 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization t o  the two crises . 
"The task,  illustrated by recent event s ,  is  to assur� unity and 
strength as against the threat of aggression ,  which became a 
brutal reality in Hung.qry . " 173 
At :::i· December 18  news conference Secr�tary Dulles evaluated 
the ultimate effect of the Hungarian experience on American 
171Ibid . ,  p .  945 .  1 72Ib1d . ,  p .  948 . 
173rbid . ,  December 24/3 1 ,  1956 , p .  981 . 
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foreign policy. He explained th�t the United State� understood 
the Soviet Uni on' s  c oncern about its  western fronti er.  There­
fore , the United States had no intenti on of s eeking allies in 
Eastern Europe.  Furthermore , the American government would not 
seek to take advantage of the tension in  Eastern Europe by 
confronting the Soviets there . However , Dulles , like Nixon, 
was unwilling to abandon liberation entirely .  The modified 
vers ion that the Secretary of State now advocated called for 
the gradual evolution of Eastern Europe away from Soviet 
controi . 174 
1 74rbid . ,  January 7 , 1957 , p .  578 . 
2 .  United Nations Acti on 
Although unB.ble and unwilling to as s i st the Hungarian 
rebels unilaterally , the United States did take pos itive steps 
at the United Nations to rally world opinion against the Soviet 
Union and its  repressive tactics .  Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge 
cooperated with Britain and France in a Sunday, October 28 
request to have the Hungarian issue brought before the Securtty 
Counc i l .  The request was granted despite vigorous Soviet 
objections . 175 At 4 : 00 P.M.  on Monday ,  October 29 the Security 
Counci l  met and voted 9-1 to di scuss the Hungarian cri s i s .  As 
this vote was being taken an even greater peril t o  world peace 
WRS precipi tated by the Israeli invas ion of Egypt . 1 76 
On 'rhursday, November 1 the Soviet  Unton tJ.ust have been 
dismayed to learn that the Hungarian government of Imre Na.gy 
had asked that its proclamati on of neutrality and request for 
United Nations protection be pl�ced before the General Assembly 
for consideration. Following renewed �ppeals by Nagy on the 
next day, 1 77 the United Nations Security Counci l  met ,  but with 
l i ttle success .  Western efforts to  provide a means for the 
175Ibid. , November 1 2 ,  1956 , p .  757.  
1 76wil�i�m J.  Mill er t Henry Cabot Lodge : A Biography ( New York : ue1neman , 1967 J ,  p . 274. 
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United Nati ons to prevent the relnforce1�ent of Russ ian troops 
in  Hungary wer� un�vailing . 178 At the same moment the General 
Assembly was struggling with the not inconsequential deci s i on 
c oncerning which Hungarian delegate actually represented the 
government of his nation. At this time it appeared that 
Peter Kos was to be replaced by the Nagy retiime ' s  J�nos Szab0. 
A final dec i si on on the matter was postponed after Sz3.bO 
presented his credentials . 1 79 
On November 3 the United States f 1na.J ly ,  and me.ny critics 
say belatedly , took the initiative and pushed for action.  After 
a speech outlining what had happened in Hungary durin� the past 
week, Lodge introduced a resolution calling on the Soviet Union 
to "desist  from any form of interventi on ,  particularly armed 
intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary . "1 80 The 
ambassador asked for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary , 
an internati onal a.ffirma.ti on of the Hungarian right of responsible 
government , and immediate relief to be forwarded to that strife­
torn nati on. 181  
Dealing with the parallel crises of Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East ,  i t  was not until a J : OO A . M .  November 4 emergency 
meeting of the Security Counci l  that a vote was taken on Lodge ' s  
resolution.  Unsurprisingly , the res olution was vetoed by the 
178New York Times , November J ,  1956 , p .  1 . 
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Soviet Union. It  was only then that approval was given to 
General Assembly consideration of the Hungarian cri s i s .  
Delegates to  the United Nations were by then aware that the 
future of the internati onal organization and, i ndeed , of the 
world depended on their handling of the twin crises before 
them. 1 82 
At 4 : JO on the afternoon of November 4 ,  the United Nations 
General Assembly met in  emergency session to  deal with the recent 
Soviet attack on Budapes t .  The Soviet repression of  the previ ous 
week had seemed tende� in  comparison with the action of the last 
few hours . Ambassador Lodge spoke at length castigating Soviet 
behavior. He quoted Soviet and Eastern European praise  of 
Imre Nagy of just a few days before . According to  Lodge , Nagy 
made the mistake of  being "a  Communist who sought t o  lead his 
country to  freedom from Soviet enslavement . 11 l 8J Lodge professed 
to be particularly shocked by the Soviet use of "incendiary 
phosphorus shell s . "  He also appealed to the pride snd prestige 
of the United Nations , claiming that the Soviets had intenti onally 
deceived that body with such statements as their October JO 
declaration. 1 84 The climax of Lodge ' s  emoti onal address was 
a warning that "if  we fail to  act , it  will constitute a base 
betrayal of the people of Hungary , who have appe�led to us for 
aid ." 185 Almost four hours after the General Assembly convened, 
1 821b1d. 
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i t  passed 5 0-8( 15 abstenti ons ) a United States resolution very 
similar to  that previously vetoed by the Soviet Union in the 
Security Counc i l .  An added provision requested that United 
Nations observers be allowed to enter Hungary immediately . 186 
The observer clause was to  be a continual topic of ferment in 
the next few weeks as the Soviet Union repeatedly rej ected 
inspection tours of Hungary. The Eisenhower administration was 
also widely criticized within the United States for not getting 
United Nations observers into Hungary several days earlier,  when 
the Nagy government would probably have welcomed them. 
On November 8 and 9 the United Nations passed a series 
of three important resolutions dealing with the Hungarian 
situat i on .  Free electi ons for Hungary were supported by a 
vote of 48-11 ( 16 abstentions ) .  A subsequent resolution calling 
f or immediate ,  large-scale shipments of medical supplies , food­
stuffs , and clothes t o  Hungary passed una.nimously with only the 
Soviet bloc abstaining. A United States resolution urging the 
Soviet Union to cease i t s  vi olent tactics and cooperate in 
relief efforts was approved 53-9 ( 13 abstentions ) . 187 
Passage of the United States resolution was encouraged 
by another Lodge speech in which he lamented the continued 
bl0odshed in liungary. As the United States ' public c ombatant 
on the Hungarian i s sue , i t  was his responsioility to  bring 
internati onal wrath down upon the Soviet rulers . Saying that 
Hungarian representative Janos Szabo, who had by this time been 
186stebbins , The United States in World Affairs, 1956 , 
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s eated, was � Soviet puppet , Lodge proclaimed that only United 
Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj old c ould correctly 
observe e.nd report on the current Hungari an situation .  Of 
particular concern was the reported mas sive deportati on of 
Hungarians to Soviet labor camps . He urged ag�in 1mmedi�te 
relief efforts and further refugee aid. Lodge was also pleased 
to ann0unce that five thousand refugees would be permitted to 
enter the United States immediately . Deputy United States 
representative James J. Wadsworth announced the same day that 
the United States would make available to the United Nati ons 
one million dollars to be used for assistance to Hungarian 
refugees . 188 
As the Hungarian cri s i s  lost its immediate danger, the 
United Nations turned to other problems . However, on November 12 
in the continuing dialogue concerning United Nations observers , 
the Hungarian government of Janos Kadar again refused to accept 
any or to allow a visit by the Secretary-Gener�l .  The United 
Nations was compelled to retreat to its field of effectiveness 
and on November 2 1  passed a series of three resolutions dealing 
with relief and refugee m�tters . It was not long , however, 
until  the United States chose t o  again rais e  the observation 
question.  A United State8 res olution of December 4 calling for 
Hungary t q  admit observers by December 7 and providing for 
observers in neighboring nations passed by a vote of 55-8 ( 1J absten-
188u. s . ,  Department of State ,  Bulletin, November 19 , 1956 , 
pp. 804-806 . 
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tl ons ) ,  but to no ava11. 189 
Henry Cabot Lodge again took the floor on December 1 0  
t o  prepare the delegates for � final resolut i on on the H�ngarian 
question. The United States ambassador summarized the resoluti ons 
passed s ince November 4 .  After comparing Soviet action i n  Hungary 
to that of German Fuhrer Adolf Hitler , Lodge proclaimed that the 
Hungarian revolution had proved forever the failure of the commu-
nist system. With that futile gesture , he called for a final 
resolution condemning Sovi et action. 190 The resolution thus 
introduced condemned the Soviet  Union for violating the United 
NAtions charter and called upon the Soviets to permit Hungary 
to practice political independence .  A final plea was m�de for 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops �.nd the admission of United 
Nations observers . After the resolution passed 55-8 ( 1 3  absten­
ti ons ) ,  Ambassador Lodge declared that the United Nations had 
reached the clim-x of its  activities  on the Hungaria.n cri s i s .  
Indeed, i t  was true that between November 4 and December 1 2 ,  
ten successive res olutions were passed , and all were ignored 
by the Soviet Uni on. 191 
The United States publicly exhibited again its  c oncern 
for the welfare of the Hungarian refugees when on December 1 5  
i t  �dded four milJ i on dollars to i t s  original gift o f  one million 
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dollars to the United Nati ons for refugee assistaRce .  The 
check was off'ici�lly presented to Secretary-General Hammarskj old 
two days later. Thus did the immediate United Nations activity 
c oncerning the 1956 Hungarian revolt end . 192 
But numerous speeches were still to be given. Frustration 
h�d s till to be vented. On September 1 9 ,  1 957 , the General 
Assembly met to consider a report of the Spcc�al Committee on 
Hungary , which had originally been intended t o  constitute the 
observation team that never reached Hungarian s o i l .  The United 
States endorsed the c ommittee report and introducea a final futile 
resolution calling on the Soviet Union and the Kadar government 
"to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian peopl e ;  
t o  respect the liberty and political independence o f  Hungary and 
the Hungarian people !s  enj oyment of fundamental human rights �nd 
freedoms ; and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian 
citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic s . " 193 The adoption of this resolution came four da.ys 
later by a vote of 60-10( 1 0  abstentions ) .  The State Department 
c oncluded that at this point the United Nations had done all 
within its power to aid the unfortunate Hungarians . 194 
The United Nations had again been used as the i ns trument 
of nationalistic foreign policy by a major nation. The United 
192u . s . , Department of Stat e ,  Bulletin, January 7 ,  1957 , 
p .  9 .  
193aichard P .  Stebbins , The United States in World Affairs , 
1957 ( New York: Harper �nd Brothers , 1958), p .  317 . 
194rbid . ,  p .  318 .  
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States worked its will At the int�rnati onal parliament . But 
also once again the United Nati ons failed to curb the nati onal-
i stic practices of a major power. The long series of condemna-
tory resoluti ons did nothing to alter Soviet policy.  
Could the United States have made more effective use of 
the United Nations in the Hungarian cri s i s ?  One small obstacle 
to American plans w�s the defensive att i tude i t  was necessary 
to take on Soviet allegations of United States encouragement 
of insurrection.  Particularly drawing communist ire were 
A.meric�n radio broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain .  Ambassador 
Lodge in  October and November had t o  deny Soviet charges of -
Western c onspiracy to incite  rebellion. 195 
Various other United Nattons 3Cti ons could have been 
called for by the United States . Denial of a seat in  the 
General Assembly to Kadar ' s  regime was considered, but i t  was 
decided that action should be directed against the Soviet  Union 
rather than its satellite .  There is  no  indication that United 
Nations military force was ever considered, particularly since 
there was another major conflict in the Middle Eas t . 196 
Sherman Adams reports that Senator William Knowland at a 
February 20 ,  1957 , meeting of congressi onal leaders at the 
White House inquired c oncerning the feasibility of a United N3t1 ons 
195u.s . ,  Department of St�te , Bulletin, November 1 2 ,  1956 , 
p .  759 and December 3 ,  1956 , p .  867. 
196stebbins , The United States in World Affairs, 1956 ,  
p .  351 . 
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appli cation of sanctions �gainst the Soviet Union. Amb�ssador 
Lodge disc ouraged that suggestion by stating categorically that 
the United Nations would never vote sancti ons against ei ther of 
the world ' s  two greatest powers . 197 
Life editorialist William J. Miller was among those 
critical of the United States for operating too slowly in the 
United Nations . He asserts that the United Nations should have 
had observers in Hungary by November J ,  one day after Im.re Nagy 
asked for protection. Furthermor e ,  Nagy ' s  government sent 
Anna Kethly to New York City to replace Janos Szabo as United 
Nati ons representative , but she was never seated . Miller 
blames the delay primarily on Ambassador Lodge ' s  consent to a 
week end adj ournment on Friday, November z . 198 Apparently Lodge 
acted in such a manner because it was hoped that the Soviet-
Hungarian negotiations then going on might develop a satisf�ctory 
s ©lution. 199 Instead, the Soviet Union turned loose its  military 
might on defenseless Hungary, and the United Nations W&s compelled 
to call an immediate emergency session. 
Lodge then does have critic s ,  as does President Eisenhower, 
but the president had only kind words for his ambassador in a 
late 1956 letter : 
• • •  I want to express to you my appreciati on of 
the outstanding j ob you have done as U .  s .  repre­
sentative to the United Nations . Particularly in 
p .  1 .  
197Adams ,  Firsthand Report , p .  284. 
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these last months of internati onal cri s i s  and 
great s train, it  has been a source of tremendous 
sati i::faction to me t o  know that you were so a.bly 
representing us in the council of nations .200  
200Miller, Henry Cabot Lodge , pp. 279-280 . 
J .  Relief and Aid to Refugees 
•rhe only immediate assistance that could be offered 
Hungarian citizens by the United States was 111 the form of 
relief and refugee aid. Even this humani ta.ria.n gesture was 
severely l imited by fear of possible Soviet reaction, and 
direct relief lasted only until  the Red Army was able to elim-
inate such harmless intervention. 'rhe first United States 
relief steps were begun on October 31 when the American 
government offered two thousand tons of foodstuffs for relief 
within Hungary and to fleeing refugees . Two days later 
President Eisenhower announced authori zation for the expenditure 
of $2 0 , 000, 000 for relief purpos es . 2 01 On November J the 
president attempted t o  encourage private contributions to 
Hungarian relief by releasing a letter from the American 
Red Cross  a.n::i.ouncing that it  had spent $1JO , OOO in one week 
on this pro ject. 202 
However, the great humanitarian cri sis  existed not within 
Hungary , but at its border. In the last two months of 1956 , 
two percent of the entire Hungarian population fled the c ountry . 
Approximately 2 0 0 , 000 Hungarian citizens chose t o  place their 
201u . s . , Department of State ,  Bulletin, November i'2 ,  1956 , 
p .  764 .  
202New York Times , November 4 ,  1956 , p .  3 5 .  
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future in the hands of foreigners r�ther than face the conseq11ences 
of submitting to a government which they had tried to overthrow . 2 03 
The conscience of the inhabitants of the United States 
immediately began to override the historic di sapproval of 
Eastern European inunigrants .  Sympathy for the refugees led to 
public pressure to admit a number of them substantially higher 
than that allowed by the McCarran-Walter Act . 204 On November 8 
President Eisenhower announced that he w�s directing the 
Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act to i,..!'lmediately admit 
f ive thousand refugees despite any laws t o  the c ontrary. The 
usual security check and assurance of j obs for the refugees 
was to be greatly liberalized. It was further requested that 
all organizati ons and individuals that could offer j obs , housing, 
"' o r. or financial assistance c ontact the Refugee Relief  Administration . �  � 
Within two weeks the president was able t o  warmly praise  the 
nation ' s  efforts in providing homes for the fleeing Hungaria,ns . 206 
On November 26  Eisenhower spoke to one of the first 
c ontingents of Hungarians to  reach American shore s .  His  words 
of c omfort were intended not only for the refugees ,  but f or all 
Hungarians . However, it i s  possible that his c omments seemed 
but a meager offering to those who had expected military and 
political sup�ort. 
203Lukacs , A New His tory, p.  145 . 
2 04Jethro K. Lieberman, Are Americans Extinct? (New York: 
Walker and Company , 1968 ) ,  p .  1 18. 
2 05Russell Baker, "U.S . To Admit 5 , 000 Hungarians , "  
New York Times , November 9 ,  1956 , pp . 1 ,  1 2 .  
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I want to tell you that this c ountry not only 
resents it  deeply but we will never agree thRt thi s  
i s  the kind of thing one country may d o  i n  justice 
to n.nother. 
We shall continue in our efforts to try to help 
ti1ose who s.:tre coming out , and , as you know, �·: c have 
offered to send in  supplies of food �nd medicine 
and other assistance to help those still in the . _ 
c ountry . We will continue to do that , and we will 
be very , very glad to do s o .2 07 
By the ti�e Eisenhower spoke to the refugee s ,  a minor 
crisis had developed concerning the number of refugees to be 
admitted. On November 24 Senator William Langer(R-North Dakota ) 
called attent i on t o  the recent influx of people into Auttria 
and suggested that the United States admit at least 2 5 , 000 
Hungarians . Chairman of the House Judiciary Immigrati on and 
Nationality Subcommi t t e e  Francis  E .  Wqlter( D-Pennsylva.nla ) 
advised tha t all Hungarians who c ould possibly be cared f or 
should be admitted. Recently returned from a tour of the 
Hungari�n border ,  w�lter recommended that they be given 
temporary admiss i on visas s ince most Hungarians he had inter-
viewed stated an intention to eventually return to their home­
land. 208 
In response to such pressure , the Chief Executive 
announced on December 1 that over 2 1 , 000 refugees would be 
given asylum in the United States . He also requested emergency 
legislation to allow the refugees to become permanent residents 
of their new home . 209 However, the maj ority of refugees were 
207  6 Ibid . , December 1 0 ,  195 , p .  91) . 
2 08"Hungary , "  Con�ressional Quarterly Weekly Report ,  
November JO ,  1956 , p.  1 02 . 
2 09Eisenhower , Waging Peac e ,  p .  98 .  
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to be admitted as "parolees" under section 2 1 2 ( d ) ( 5 )  of the 
McCarran-Walter Act .  This provided that the immigrants were 
to be returned to their native land when c onditions allowed� 
unless they had previously been accepted through normal channels . 
Such a provision was obviously unsatisfactory , as it  left the 
unfortunate refugee in a very uncertain position. 21 0  The 
president ' s  request for emergency legislation to solve this 
regrettable problem went unheeded in the 1957 congres s . 211  
After an early sincere concern for the welfare of the Hungarian 
refugees ,  Congressman Walter reverted to his usual position on 
immigration. On F.ebruary 1 8 ,  1957 , the Pennsylvanian expres sed 
fsars that many economic opportunists were entering the United 
States in the disguise of freedom fighters . Congressman 
George s .  Long ( D�Lousi�na ) �ccused the Hungarian refugees of 
c owardice and said they were leaving Hungary for economic reasons . 
He expressed concern that their admiss i on to the United States 
would upset the American economy. A s imilar fear w-s expressed 
by another s outherner in the senate .  John Stenni s ( D-Missis sippi ) 
also suspected s ome immigrants of being Soviet-c ontrolled 
c o!llillunists , whose intention was to subvert the American military 
machine . The senator suggested that the Hungarian refugees be 
formed into a freedom c o�ps to fight as a unit of the North 
2 1 0Lieberman, Are Americans Extinct ? ,  p .  1 1 8 .  
2 1 lstebbins , The United States in  World Affairs, 1957, 
p .  80.  
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Atlantic Treaty Organi zation.212  Traditional opposition to 
immigration combined with such thinking as that of Sen�tor 
Mike Monroney( D-Oklahoma ) to defeat attempts to waive norm&l 
immigration requirements for the Hungarians . Monroney said 
on December 1 5 ,  i956 , that the refugees should be kept close 
to Hungary so that they could actively fight communism.2 1) 
Eventually 24 , 000 Hungarians were admitted under the 
parolee clause .  It w�s not until 1958, however , that c ongress 
adequately dealt with the question of their precise  status . 
In that year i t  authorized their permanent residency i n  the 
United States and allowed them to apply for c itizenship.2 1 4  
A further instrument of refugee aid was the President ' s  
Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relie f ,  created on December 1 2 , 1956 , 
with Tracy Voorhees as i ts chairman. Members , who were to 
serve without pay , were charged with the responsibility of 
coordinating the numerous publi c ,  privat e ,  and individual 
efforts to aid the refugees .  Vice-chairman William Hallam Tuck 
was �ssigned to Austria , where he was to work with Ambassador 
Llewellyn E .  Thompson in funneling Hungarians t o  the United 
Stat e s .  Als o  announced o n  December 1 2  was a trip t o  Austria 
duritl2; the next week by Vice-Pres ident Richard M. Nixon . He 
21255th Co� . ,  1st  sess . ,  February 1 8 ,  1957 , Congressional 
Record, CII I ,  2 183 and February 2 0 ,  1957 , 2 365  and March 2 , 1957 , 
2937-2939 . 
213"Around the Capitol , "  Coe?res s l onal Quarterly Weekly 
Report ,  December 21 , 1956 , p .  146 • 
214Lieberman, Are Americans Extinct?,  pp. 119-12 0 .  
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was to investigate the refugee situation and determine proper 
procedures for providing assistance.2 1 5  Nixon' s  lengthy report 
was tendered on JRnu2ry 1 ,  1957,  and served as one basis of 
future United States policy .  The vice-president reported tha.t 
the refugees were ttof the highest order .. and had been leaders 
in the freedom movement . He could discover very few refugees 
who had left Hungary for merely economic reas ons . He also 
assured congress and the American labor unions that most of the 
Hungarians hoped t o  return to their native land when a govern-
mental change made that poss ible. Congressional concern for 
nati onal security was alleviated by an assertion that all 
immigrants to the United States were being carefully screened 
to eliminate possible communi st spies . The immigrants ,  
according to Nixon, would be an asset to their new nation 
and should be admi tted in unlimited numbers . Such action 
required the immediate amendment of the immigration laws .216 
Despite intense and understandable Americ�n desires to 
the contrary , it  is  true that the United St�tes could not 
unilaterally t�ke any military or political acti on to support 
the Hungarian revolution. But much was done to exhibit 
humanitarian concern for all the people of Hungary. The most 
obvious manifestation of as sistance was in providing a refuge 
for thousands of Hungarians , despite traditi onal American policy 
2 1 5u. s . ,  Department of Stat e ,  Bulletin,  December 24/Jl , 1956 , 
pp. 979 , 980. 
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and existing law. American moral and materi�l support was 
deserved and was given in abundance .  This was all that c ould 
be done , 3nd yet it was not s o  little . Herein lies a lesson 
for American policy-makers . 
4.  Critique of American Action in Hungary 
Sincere regret was widespread throughout the nation after 
the United States realized the full horror of the Hungarian 
revolution and America ' s  inability to be of assistance.  
Looking back on October and November of 1956 , Eis enhower in his 
memoirs maintains that the temptation to intervene militarily 
i n  Hungary would have been very great had there been available 
to the United States a land or sea access route to  th�t beleaguered 
nation. Austria closed the only possible door with an early and 
vehement declaration that its s oil or air space could not be used 
t o  go  to  the defense of Hungary . Had Austria not made such a 
proclamation,  however , i t  i s  4oubtful th�t Eisenhower would 
really have ri sked world w�r. Another prerequi site of American 
action would have been cooperation by our �llies in Europe. 
Such agreement was impQssible due to the Suez cris i s  and 
undoubtedly would not have been forthcoming under any international 
circumstances .  Eisenhower also knew that the United Nati ons would 
reject any military action due t o  the fear of nuclear war. There­
fore , no attempt was made by Ambass&dor Lodge t o  create a United 
Nati ons military mis si on to Hungary . Being unable to act alone 
and lacking international support for military 9ction, the United 
States , according to  Eisenhower, could do very little . "So, as a 
s ingle nation the United States did the only thing it couldt We 
readied ourselves in every way possible to help the refugees 
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fleeing from the criminal action of the Soviets , and did ev�ry­
thing pos sible to condemn the aggression . "2 1 7  
Secretary o f  State John Foster Dulles l isted similar 
reasons to forego military intervention .  He pointed out the 
tactical truth that intervention by the neareat available 
American troops in Germany c ould lead only to their c omplete 
defeat by the massive Rus sian f orces in  Hung�ry . Therefore , 
only full-scale military intervention was practical , and such 
intervention would predictably le•4 t o  nuclear war . The first 
victims of nuclear war would undoubtedly be those very Hungaria.ns 
whose welfare had prompted the original activities that ignited 
the nuclear holocaust .  Again the only rational logic demanded 
American inaction.218  But Dulles was not entirely di smayed by 
the Hungarian revolt . He c ertainly refused t o  admit that the 
Eisenhower administration had ever encouraged armed revolt 
behind the Iron Curtain ,  but he believed that suicidal rebellion 
was not necessarily wrong or foolish.  Dulles asserted that the 
entire world had been inspired by Hungarian bravery . "The 
demonstration has to be made from time to time that people are 
willing to die for freedom . "219 
Agreement that the United States was drastically limited� 
in  its alternative courses of action is widespread. Certainly 
217Eisenhower , Waging Peac e ,  pp. 88-89 � 
218orummond and Coblent z ,  Duel At the Brink , p .  181 . 
219John Robinson Beal , John Foster Dulles : A Biography 
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other members of the Eisenhower administration support the 
eventual decision. Said Sherman Adams , "Eisenhower could do 
little but watch the Hungarians suffer and offer them sympathy , 
relief and asylum . "220 Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert 
Murphy was equally perplexed. "Perhaps history will demonstrate 
that the free world could have intervened t o  give the Hungarians 
the liberty they sought , but none of us in the State Department 
had the skill or the imagination to devi se a way . "2 21 More crit-
ical observers also support the c ontention that nothing more 
could have been done to aid Hungary. Richard P .  Stebbins , author 
of the valuable Council on Foreign Relations volume on 1957 inter-
nati onal relations , states that "there seemed to be little enough 
that could be done in a practical way to alleviate the sufferings 
of the Hungarian people . "222 The primary responsibility of the 
United States was to keep the Hungarian situation in  the public 
eye at the United Nations and through publicity for relief er� 
forts .223  Cold War historian John Lukacs is  among those who 
concede that military action would have irresponsibly risked a 
224 nuclear war. 
Nevertheless , the United States was not without sugges-
ti ons of appropriate responses .  Diplomat Murphy , whose task 
220  Adams , Firs thand Report , p .  255 .  
221  Murphy , Dilpomat Among Warriors , p .  432 . 
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i t  seems to have been to screen all suggestions , relates that 
f or s everal days his office was full of c ongressmen and for-
e ign ambassadors who urged various courses of action. A 
frequent , but unsatisfactory, proposal was that the Air Force 
fly supplies  to the freedom fighter s .  The obj ections of the 
c ommunist satellites and Austria,  which surround Hungary , made 
overflights imposs ible .225 
The effect of the Suez crisis  on the parallel Hungarian 
cri s i s  is  disputed. Some authors maintain that events would 
have changed little in  Hnngary had the Middle East been at 
226 peac e .  Others,  however, assert that the Suez crisis affected 
the American response in Hungary. Historians John Lukacs and 
Walter LaFeber agree th�t administration attention was focused 
in the wrong direction at a critical time . Lukacs maintains 
that the extreme concern over the Middle East at the expense 
of Eastern Europe allowed an opportunity for Soviet-American 
c ompromise in Europe to slip away .227  LaFeber is  more literary. 
"In a sense , the moment of ' liberation' seemed to be approaching. 
At the crucial point where the prophecy needed a nudge ,  how­
ever , the prophet was looking the other way . "228  Dulles bi og­
rapher John Robinson Beal is much less critical of the Secretary 
of Stat e .  According to his version,  it  i s  the British,  French , 
225Murphy , Diplomat Among Warri ors , pp. 429-430. 
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and Israelis who are responsible for the Hungarian disaster. 
He maintains that the Hungarian rebelli on would have followed 
the pe�ceful path of Poland had not the Soviets been able to 
take advantage of the distraction in the Middle East . 229 
But after thirteen years and a similar development in 
Czechoslovakia ,  it  appears doubtful that the Hungarian crisis 
would have developed in a different manner had the Middle East 
been nonexistent . The Soviet Union would certainly have 
marched into Hungary after the Nagy anti-Soviet diplomatic 
proclamations even if there had not been a Suez crisis . The 
Middle Eastern aggression certainly afforded the Soviet Union 
a propaganda shield, but not military protection, which was 
the result of the post-World War I I  configuration of power . 
The United States would never have gone into Hungary alone 
in 1956 to combat the Soviets . Furthermore , British and French 
support would not have been available even had allied relations 
been at .their  apex rather than at the nadir that was Suez .  
In short , Eastern Europe was universally recognized as  an 
incontestable Soviet sphere of influenc e .  The tragedy i s  
that Eisenhower and Dulles had not understood this basic fact 
earlier. 
For earlier the Republican administration had made state-
ments that were to haunt them. The 1952 proclamation of liber­
ation was a promise that simply c ould not be fulfilled . Critics 
of liberation are legion, but their criticisms. are widely varied. 
229Beal , John Foster Dulles , p .  317 . 
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Diplomatic historian Norman A .  Graebner accuses Dulles of 
ignoring the realities of the world power structure after 
W orld War II . Liberation i s  said to be a result of what 
Graebner calls the "new isolationism" of J .  Edgar Hoover, 
Robert Taft , Joseph McCarthy , William Knowland , and Douglas 
.MacArthur. Their isolationism precluded any c onflict-s.lleviating 
agreements with the "evil" c ommunists.  The United States must 
never c ompromise its security by negotiating with the Soviet 
Union. Graebner further points out that liberation was taken 
seriously by milli ons of Americans who supported the "new 
isolationi sts . "  They believed that American treachery had 
finally been ended by a forceful Republican admini strati on. 
Millions of other Americans , however , v iewed liberation as a 
230 possible detonator of world war. 
In Europe liberation was viewed in two different ways . 
In Eastern Europe hope of American military assistance was 
raised to unwarranted heights . Such hope was to  suffer cruel 
disillusi onment in East Germany , Poland , and Hungary . Western 
Europe greatly feared liber�tion as a step tow�rd European 
war. It seemed to many Europeans that the distant Americans 
sh owed too li ttle concern for the safety of their European 
allies in a possible nuclear confrontation in Europe .231 
Liberation was also critici zed by Americans as an un-
realistic and unattainable goal . John Spanier calls liberation 
ZJOGraebner, New Isolationism, pp. 91 , 110.  
231 Drummind and Coblent z ,  Duel At the Brink, p. 80.  
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a result of the " illusion of American omnipotenc e . "232 He 
further suggests that good intentions and noble pronounce­
ments have little influence on international affairs .233 
Norman A. Graebner maintains that liberation w�s a sincere 
political promise that simply could not be fulfilled when it 
was measured against reality . Furthermore , Graebner charges · 
that merely the proclamation of liberati on seriously handi-
capped AmericRn efforts to achieve any progress in Eastern 
234 Europe by negotiations . 
Perh�ps the most stinging criticism of liberation is the 
charge that it was��n insincere political ploy . It �ppears 
t o  many that liberation was mostly rhetoric and had little 
real �ubstance to i t .  No plans were ever made by the Eisen-
hower administration to deal with armed revolt in Eastern 
Europe .235 Spanier maintains that American inaction in East 
Germany , Poland , and Hungary proves that liberation was "never 
me3nt to be more than a verbal appeal to the American people . "236 
In fact , "the policy of liberation s eems to have been devised 
primarily to roll back the Democrats in the United States , 
not the Red Army in Eastern Europe . "237 
But how was the liberation policy affected by the Hungarian 
disaster? The policy of liberation was to be condemned as foolish 
232John Spani er, American Foreign Policy Since World 
War II ( New York: Praeger , 1965), p .  1 04. 
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235Drummond and Coblentz ,  Duel At the Brink, p .  79 . 
236spanier , Am 1 F i P li 106 er can ore gn o cy , p .  • 
2371, id 0 . ,  p .  105 . 
87 
and impractical in late 195 6 .  As early as November 7 the Americ�n 
policy in Eastern Europe was cri tici zed beca.use " our policy and 
interests are unclear even to ourselves . "238 It was said that 
liberation was merely a slogan, without careful planning or 
thought behind it . 239 Historian John Lukacs asserts that most 
Americans by 1956 had recognized. liberation as a political 
gimmick rather than a sound policy. "But we cannot expect the 
uns ophisticated and desparate people of Hungary to have dis-
counted this propaganda accordingly, massively broadcast as it 
was from American-supported radio stations in West Germany to 
Eastern Europ e . "240 Possibly the most cynical approach to the 
Eisenhower administration is  that expressed by Stevenson bio-
gr�.pher Herbert J.  Null er . 
The principal achievement of his administration, 
indeed, WAS that it maintained peace by not ful­
filling its pledges or carrying out its threat s .  
When Russian troops ruthlessly crushed the Hungarian 
Revolut i on ,  for instanc e ,  it did nothing to  help 
'liberate ' the unfortunate Hungarians , e2a.r assuring 
the Soviets that 1 t would not intervene . · 
An oft-repeated argument i s  that Radio Free Europe and 
Voice of America encouraged revolt behind the Iron Curtain. 
In 1953 the Eisenhower administration encouraged the broad­
casting of liberati on propaganda on the government-sponsored 
238c .L .  Sulzberger , "Areas Where Brinkmanship Couldn 't 
�ork , "  New York Time s ,  November 7 ,  1956 , p.  JO.  
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Voice of America and the privately-operated Radio Free Europe . 
Both sent behind the Iron Curtain praise for the United States 
and condemnati on of the Soviet Uni on.242 Contributing to the 
inflammatory nature of the broadcasts was the hiring of Eastern 
European refugees as writers and announcers . The stated moder-
ate policies of the Voice of America and Radi o  Free Europe 
could easily be violated by the disenchanted exiles .243 Radio 
Free Europe was a p�rticular villain during the revolt itself . 
It constantly pressured Imre Nagy to seek increasing degrees 
of independence from the Soviet Union. Meanwhil e ,  the citizens 
of Hungary were being encouraged to demand foolhardy protests 
of independence by Nagy . All of this propaganda was being 
supported by promises  of United States aid. 244 Adding to the 
confusion were United States diplomatic instructions to Nagy 
to moderate the revolt s o  that the Soviet Union would not 
intervene . These contradictory demands coincided with the 
indecision of American policy-makers , who cautioned the 
Hungarians to move slowly at the same time they were debunking 
the revolt as mere nati onalistic c om.m.unism.245 The Soviet 
Union was quick to recognize the propaganda value of the Radio 
Free Europe broadcast s .  The United States was accused of 
242charles o .  Lerche , Jr. , The Cold War • • •  and After , 
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inciting ri ots throughout Eastern Europe .  Even the Western 
allies suggested that possibly the broadcasts had unintenti on­
ally fomented rebellion.246 
Nor was radio broadcasting the only American activity 
t o  be criticized. An American reporter in Budapest during 
1956 was very critical of the legation ' s  handling of the revo-
lutionary situation. He asserts that efforts to put the lega­
tion in contact with the rebel leaders in early 1956 were 
repeatedly rej ected by legation officials . Consequently , when 
revolution came , the Americans charged with the responsibility 
of advising Washington understood little of what was happening . 
The legation also failed to give minimum humanitarian assistance 
to thos e injured or displaced by the rebellion, although other 
legations made such aid available .247 
There were surprisingly few constructive suggestions to 
the United States government after the revolt on the nature of 
future relations with Eastern Europe . The man destined to 
become the next President of the United States did suggest that 
the government talk less of liberation and be willing to accept 
a very gradual evolution of Eastern Europe away from Soviet 
influence. 248 The decisive observation ,  however , was to come 
fro� the Nati onal Security Council , which was asked after the 
246stebbins , The United States in World Affairs, 1956 , 
P •  306 . 
247Bain , "How We Failed , "  pp . 26-2 7 .  
248 John F .  Kennedy , "A Democratic Looks at Foreign Policy•, tt 
Foreign Affairs , XXXV ( October , 1957 ) ,  47 .  
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Hungarian cri s i s  to evaluate what had been done and what 
c ould be done in the future . The Council concluded that the 
national interest of the United States required that Eastern 
Europe be recognized as a sphere of Soviet influence . 249 
That had been the policy of the United States s ince 1945 and 
was to  continue in  effect through the 196 0 ' s .  
249 Weint�l and Bartlet t ,  Facing the Brink, p .  210.  
V. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Hungarian revolution �nd Suez cris i s  co�bined during 
one month of 1956 to drastically alter the internati onal scene . 
Four of the world ' s  major nations--the United States ,  Britain, 
Franc e ,  and the Soviet Union--suffered severe losses as a result . 
The emerging nations of the world were shocked by the treachery 
of Britain, France ,  and the Soviet Union and were dismayed by 
the ineffectual naivete of the United States . The new nations 
of Asia and Africa began to realize the importance of avoiding 
entangling alliances with either the East or the West.  
The Suez and Hungarian crises together certainly fore­
shadowed an interruption of the bipolarity that had ruled the 
world ' s  diplomatic relations since World War I I .  It was now 
obvious that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
could any longer control their spheres of influence without 
considerable dispute .  No  longer could the Soviet Union totally 
ignore Eastern European demands and no longer could the United 
States expect perfect c ooperation from its allies .  The eventual 
result of this realization is  still to come . Ho�ever, it  now 
appears likely that the world ' s  bipolarity will dissolve into 
a much less dangerous and more s table poly.centrism ,  with 
substantial power emanating from several geographical locations 
rather than just two .250 
25°Lerche , The Cold War, p .  105. 
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The events i n  Poland and Hungary during 1956 led to  a 
modif i ed centralized control of the communist bloc . A poly-
centric system of power developed in the communist world, 
particularly with the rise of Red China . However ,  each of 
the other Iron Curtain nations als o  began exerting slightly 
more influence in their own diplomatic affairs .251 Similar 
testimony comes from John Spanier ' s  American Foreign Policy 
Since World War I I ,  in which ha .. �discusses a similar development 
in the Western alliance system. Certainly there is no better 
example than the Suez crisis . Britain and particularly France 
were no longer willing t o  follow the United States without 
question. Spanier goes on to  laud polycentrism as a valuable 
step toward world peac e . 2 52 
Of equally momentous significance to  the Cold War was the 
concession to Soviet clatms in Eastern Europe implicit in 
American inaction.  The United St�tes finally proved to the 
Kreml i n ' s  satisfaction that it had conceded Eastern Europe 
t o  the Soviet sphere of influenc e .  When the Soviet Uni on 
became convinced of the security of the buffer states on 
their western frontier , its  leader could sincerely profess 
peaceful coexistenc e .  Some historians even cite November , 1956 , 
as the end of the Cold War.253 
251Henry L. Robert s ,  "The Crisis i n  the Soviet Empire , "  
Foreign Affairs , XX:XV ( January , 195 7 ) , , 191 . 
252spani er, A�erican Foreign Policy ,  pp. 242 -26 9 .  
253 
Lukacs ,  A New History ,  pp . 153-154 and Richard l"i .  Abra.ms 
and Lawrence W .  Levine , The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Americ a :  
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What of future American policy toward Eastern Europe ? 
The United States must forever discard the discredited 
liberation policy. However, there i s  no merit to isolating 
the nation from Eastern Europe . The United States must use 
the current thaw in international relations to seek contacts 
in Eastern Europe .  Bridges should indeed be  built so that 
contact with the people of Eastern Europe can again be possible .  
Only by this approach can the free nations of  the world expect 
to eventually withdraw Eastern Europe from the total control 
of the Soviet Union. In fact , it is almost exclusively by 
their own efforts that these nations must regain their nati onal 
independence and freedom. 
APPENDIX 
Excerpt from addre s s  "The Task of Wa�ing Peace" 
by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before 
the Dallas C ounc i l  on World Affa.irs in Dallas , 
Texas , on October 2 7 ,  1956* 
• • •  Another intensive concern o f  our foreign policy 
i s  in relation to the c�pti�e nat i ons of the world. We had 
looked upon World War II as a war of liberation. The Atlantic 
Charter and the United Nations Declarat i on committed all the 
Al l i e s  to restore sovereign rights and s elf-government to those 
who had been forcibly deprived of them and to recognize the 
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they would live . Unhappi ly , t ho s e  pledges have been 
v iolated, and i n  Eastern Europe one form of c onquest was 
merely replaced by another. 
But the spirit of patri o t i s m ,  and the l onging of' indi vid­
uals for freedom of t hought a.nd of cons c i ence and the right to 
mold their own lives , are forces which erode and finally break 
the i ron bonds of serv itude . 
Today we s e e  dram�t1c evidence of t h i s  trut h .  The Polish 
people now loosen the S ov i e t  grip upon the land they love . And 
t h e  heroic people of Hungary ch,__l lenge the murderous fire of 
Red Army t.9.nks . These patriots value liberty more than l ife 
i t s e l f .  And all w h o  peacefully enj oy liberty have a s olemn duty 
t o  s e e k ,  by all truly helpful means , that those w�o now d i e  for 
fre edom w i ll not have d i ed i n  vain. It is in this spirit t h•.t 
the United States and others have t oday acted to bring the 
s i tuation i n  Hungary to the United Nati ons Security Counci l .  
The weakness of S ov i e t  imperialism i s  being made manifest . 
I t s  weakness i s  not m i l i t ary weaknes s  nor lack of material power. 
It i s  weak bec�.use i t  s e eks to sustain an Ullllatural tyra.nny by 
suppre s s ing human aspir�tions which cannot indefinitely be 
suppre s s ed and by concealing truths which cannot indefinitely 
be hidden. 
Imperialist dictatorships often present a formidable · 
exteri or . For a t ime they may seem to be hard, gli ttering , 
and irres i s tible . But i n  reality they turn out t o  be " l i ke 
unto whited se·pulchre s ,  whi c h  1nde2:d appear beautiful outward , 
but are within full of dead men ' s  bon�s , and of all uncleanne s s . "  
They have vulnerabi l i t i e s  not e a s i ly s e e n .  
Our Nation has from i t s  beginning s timulated politi cal 
independence and human liberty throughout the world . Lincoln 
said of our Decl�.ration of Independence th�.t 1 t gave " liberty 
not alone to th� people of t h i s  c ountry , but hope to all the 
world, for all future t i me . "  During the period when our Nation 
was founded , the tides of despotism were running high . But our 
*U . S . ,  Department of Stat e ,  Bul l e t i n ,  November 5 ,  1956 , 
p .  697 . 
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free s ociety �nd its good fruits b�came known throughout the 
world and helped to inspire the subject peoples of that day to 
demand , and to get , the opportunity to  mold their own destinies . 
Today our Nation continues its  historic role .  The captive 
peoples should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a 
sincere and dedicated fri end who sh�res their aspirations . They 
must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide them­
selves over the period of economic adjustment which is  inevitable 
a s  they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of 
their own peopl e ,  rather than of exploiting mas ters . Nor do 
we c ondition ec onomic ties between us upon the adoption by these 
countries of any particular form of s ociety . 
And let me make this clear , beyond a. possi b1li ty of doubt : 
The United States has no ulterior purpose in des iring the 
independence of the satellite c ountries . Our unadulterated 
wish is  that these peoples , from whom s o  much of our own national 
life derives , should have s overeignty restored to them and 
that they should have governments of their own free choosing. 
W e  do not look upon these nations as potential mili tary alli e s .  
W e  s e e  them a s  friends and as part o f  a new and friendly and 
no longer divided Europe . We are confident that their independence ,  
if  promptly accorded, will contribute immensely to stabilize 
peace throughout all of Europe , West and East • • • •  
"Declaration By the Government of the USSR On the 
Principles of Development and Further Strengthening 
of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet 
Union a.nd Other Socialist States , October JO,  1956•* 
A policy of peaceful c oexistenc e ,  friendship ,  and cooper­
ation among all states has been and continues to be the firm 
f ound�tion of the foreign relations of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics . 
This policy finds its deepest �nd most consistent expres­
s ion in the mutual relations among the socialist countri e s .  
United by the common ideals of building a s ocialist s oci ety 
and by the principles of prolet�rian internationalism,  the 
countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can 
build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete 
equality,  of respect for territorial integrity, state inde­
pendence and sovereignty , and of noninterference in one another ' s  
internal affairs . Not only does this not exclude close fraternal 
cooperation and mutual aid among countries of the socialist  
c ommonwealth in the economic ,  political , .Rnd cultural spheres ; 
on the contrary , it  presupposes these things . 
The system of people ' s  democracies took shap e ,  grew 
strong and showed its great vital power in  many c ountries of 
Europe and Asia on this foundation after the Second World War 
and the rout of fascism. 
In the process of the rise of the new sys tetl and the 
deep revoluti onary changes in social relations , there have been 
many difficulties , unresolved problems , and downright mi stakes , 
including mistakes in the mutual relations 9�ong the socialist 
countries--violations and errors which demeaned the principle 
of equality in relations among the socialist states . 
The 2 0th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union quite resolutely condemned these violations and mtstakes ,  
and set the task of consi stent application by the Soviet 
Union of Leninist principles of equality of peoples in its 
relati ons with the other s ocialist countries . It proclaimed 
the need for taking full account of the historical past and 
peculiarities of each country that has taken the path of 
building a new life.  
�he Soviet Government is  cons istently carrying out 
these historic decisions of the 20th Congress , which create 
c onditi ons for further strengthening friendship and c ooperation 
*Zinner, National Communism, pp. 485-489 . 
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among the socialist countries on the firm foundRtion of 
o oservance of the full sovereignty of each socialist stat e .  
As recent events have domonstrated, it  has become neces­
sary to mt•.ke this declaration of the Soviet Union ' s  stand on 
the �utual relations of the USSR with other socialist countri e s ,  
particularly i n  the economic and military spheres . 
The Soviet government is  prepared to discuss together 
with the governments of other socialist states measures 
ensuring further development and strengthening of economic 
ties among the s oc ialist countries in order to remove any 
possibility of vi olation of the principles of nati onal 
s overeignty, �utual benefi t ,  and equality in economic relations . 
The principle must also be extended to advisers . It 
i s  known that , in the first period of the formation of the 
new social system , the Soviet Union, at the request of the 
governments of the people ' s  democracies , sent these countries 
a certain number of its specialists--engineers , agronomists , 
scientists , military advisers . In the recent period the 
Soviet Government has repeatedly raised before the socialist 
countries the question of recalling its advisers .  
In view of the !act that by this time the peopl e ' s  
democracies h�ve formed their own qualified national cadres 
in all spheres of economic and military affairs , the Soviet 
Government c onsiders it urgent to review, together with the 
other socialist states , the question of the expediency of the 
further presence of USSR advisers in these countries . 
In the military domain an important bas is of the mutual 
relations between the Soviet Union and the people ' s  democracies 
i s  the Warsaw rreaty ,  under which its members adopted respective 
political and military obligations , including the obligation 
to take "concerted measures necessary for strengthening 
their defense capacity in order to protect the peaceful labor 
of their peoples , to  guarantee the inviolability of their 
borders and territory , and to ensure defense against possible 
aggression . "  
It is  known that Soviet units are i n  the Hungarian and 
Rumanian republics in accord with the Warsaw Treaty �nd 
governmental agreement s .  Soviet units are in the Polish 
republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and 
the Warsaw Treaty. Soviet military units are not in the other 
people ' s  democracies . 
For the purpose of assuring �utual security of the 
s ocialist countries , the Soviet Government is prepared to  
re vi ew with the other s oci�list countries which are members of 
the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed 
on the territory of the above-mentioned countri es . In so 
doing the Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle 
that stationing the troops of one or another state which is  
a member of the Warsaw Treaty on the territory of another state 
which is a member of the treary i s  done by agreement among all 
its members and only with the consent of the state on the 
territory of which and at the request of which these troops 
are stationed or it is planned to station them. 
99 
The S0v i e t  Governm�nt considers i t  necessary to make a 
statement in connection with the eYents i!! Hungary . The c ourse 
of events has shown that the working people of Hungary, who 
have attained gre�t progress on the basis  of the people ' s  demo­
cratic system are rightfully raising the question of the need 
to eliminate seri ous defects in the sphere of economic con­
s truction, the question of further improving the living stand­
ards of the population ,  the question of combating bureaucratic 
distortions in  the state machinery. However , this legitimate 
and progressive movement of the working people was soon j�ined 
by the forces of black reaction and counterrevolution, which 
are trying to take adva�tage of the dissatisfaction of a part 
of the working people in order t o  undermine the f oundations 
of the peopl e ' s  democr�tic system in  Hungary and to restore the 
old landowner-capitalist  ways in  that c ountry . 
The Soviet Government , like the whole Soviet people , deeply 
regrets that the development of events in Hungary ha'S led to 
bloodshed. 
At the request of the Hungarian people ' s  government , the 
Soviet Government h�s granted consent to the entry into Buda­
pest of Soviet military units to help the Hungarian peopl� ' s  
army and the Hungarian agencies  of government to bring order 
to the city. 
Having in  mind that the further presence of Soviet military 
units in Hungary could serve as an excuse f or further aggrava­
t ion of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its  mili­
tary command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units 
from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary 
by the Hungarian Government . 
At the same time , the Soviet Government i s  prepared to 
enter into the appropriate negotiations with the Government of 
the Hungarian People ' s  Republic and other members of the Warsaw 
Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the 
territory of Hungary . 
To guard the socialist achievements of people ' s  democratic 
Hungary is  the chief and sacred duty of the workers , peasants , 
intelligentsia,  of all the Hung�rian1 working people at the 
present moment . 
The Soviet Government expresses confidence that the peoples 
of the s ocialist countries  will not permit foreign and domestic 
reacti onary forces to shake the f ound�tions of the people ' s  
democratic system, a system established and strengthened by 
the self-sacrificing struggle and labor of the workers , peasants , 
and intelligentsia of each country . They will continue all 
efforts to remove all obstacles in the path of further strength­
ening the democratic foundations , independence ,  and sovereignty 
of their countries ; to develop further the socialist foundations 
of each c ountry, its economy and its culture , f or the sake of 
an uninterrupted rise in  the living standards and cultural 
level of all the working people ; they will strengthen the 
fraternal unity and mutual aid of the socialist c ountries to 
buttress the great cause of peace and sociali s�. 
Excerpt from addres s  "Developments in Eastern Europe 
and the Middle East" by President Dwight D .  Ei sehnower 
t o  the nation over radio and telev i s i on on 
October 31 , 1956* 
• • •  In Eastern Europe there s e ems t o  appear the dawn of 
a new day. It has not bc�n short or easy in coming. 
After World War II , the Soviet Uni on used mili tary force 
t o  impose on the nations of Eastern Europe governments of Soviet 
choice--s ervants of Moscow. 
It has been c on s i s t ent United States p o l i c y ,  without regard 
t o  p o l i tical part y ,  t o  s e ek t o  end this s i tuati on �nd t o  ful-
f i l l  the wartime pledge of the United Nations th�t these c ountri e s , 
ov errun by wartime armi es , would once again know s overeignty and 
s e lf-government . 
We could not , of course , carry out this policy by resort 
to forc e .  Such force would have been c ontrary both t o  the best 
interests of the Eastern European peoples and t o  the abiding 
principles of the United Nat i ons . But we did help t o  keep 
alive the hope of these peoples for freedom. 
Beyond thi s ,  they needed from us no education in the 
worth of n�.t i onal independence a.nd pers onal liberty , for, at 
the time of the American Revolut i o n ,  i t  was many of them who 
came t o  our land to aid our caus e .  Recently the pressure o f  
the w i l l  of these peoples f o r  nati onal independence has b e ­
come more and more ins i s t en t .  
A few d�ys �g o ,  the people of Poland . with their proud 
and deathl e s s  devotion t o  freedom moved t o  secure a peaceful 
transi t i on t o  a !'lew government . And thi s government , i t  
s e ems , will strive genuinely t o  serve the P o l i s h  peopl e .  
And all the world has been wa.tching dramati c  events in 
Hungary where this brave peopl e ,  �.s so often i n  the pas t ,  
have offered their very l i v e s  for independence from foreign 
masters . Toda.y, it appears , a new Hungary is ris ing from 
this struggle ,  a Hung�,ry which we hope from our h ea.rts will 
know full and fre e nat ionhood . 
We have rej oiced i n  these h i s t oric events . 
Only yes terday the Soviet Union i s sued an i mportant 
s tatement on its relations with all the c ountri e s  o f  Eastern 
Europe . This statement recognized the need for review of 
S o v i e t  p o l i c i e s , and the amendment of these pol i c i e s  to meet 
the demands of the people f or greater freedom. The Soviet 
Union decl�red i t s  readiness to c onsider the wi thdrawal of 
*U . S . ,  Department o f  Sta t e ,  Bul l e t i n ,  November 12 , 1956 , 
p p .  743-744. 
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Soviet "�dvis ers , "  who have been the effective ruling force 
in Sovi et-occupied countries , and also to c onsider withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from such countries as Poland and Hungary. 
We cannot yet know if  these avowed purposes will be 
truly carried out . 
But two things are clear. 
First , the fervor and the sacrifice of the peoples of 
these countri es , in the name of freedom, have themselves brought 
real promise that the light of liberty soon will shine again 
in  thi s darknes s .  
And second, if  the Soviet Union indeed faithfully acts 
upon its announced intention, the world will witness the 
greatest forward stride t oward justice , trust , and understnnd­
ing among nations in  our generation. 
These are the facts,  How has your Government responded 
to them? 
The United States has made clear its  readiness t o  assist 
economically the new and independent governments of these 
c ountrie s .  We have already--some days since--been in contact 
with the new Government of Poland on this matter. We have 
also publicly declared that we do not demand of these govern­
ments their adoption of any particular form of society as a 
condition upon our econom.ic assistanc e .  Our one concern i s  
that they be free--for their sake , and for the freedom' s  sake . 
We have also , with respect to the Soviet Union, sought 
clearly to remove �ny fears that we would look upon new 
governments in these Eastern European countries as potential 
military allies . We have no such ulterior purpos e .  We see 
these peoples as friends , and we wish simply that they be 
friends who are free • • • •  
"Text of U.S . Dr&ft Resolution Vetoed by U . S . S .R.  
on November 4"* 
The Security Counc i l ,  
Considering that the United Nations i s  b�sed on the 
principle of the s overeign eQuality of �11 its Members ; 
Recalling th�t the enj oyment of human rights and of 
fundamental freedoms in Hungary were specifically guaranteed 
by the peace treaty between Hung�ry and the allied and 
associated powers s igned at Paris on 1 0  February 1947 and 
that the general principle of these rights and freedoms i s  
�ffirmed for �11 peoples i n  the Charter of the United Nations ; 
Convinced that present events in Hungary m-nif est clearly 
the desire of the Hungarian people to  exerc ise  �nd to enjoy 
fully their fundamental rights ,  freedoms and independenc� ;  
Deploring the use of Soviet �ilitary forces t o  suppress 
the efforts of the Hung�rian people to  reassert the ir rights ; 
Noting moreover the Declaration by the Soviet Govern-
ment of 30 October 1956 , of its avowed policy of non-intervention 
in the internal aff�irs of other st�tes ; 
Hoting the c ommunication of 1 November 1956 of the 
Government of Hungqry to the Secretary-General regarding 
demands made by that Government t o  the Government of the U . S . S .R .  
for " instant and immediate withdr�wal of Soviet forces" ; 
Noting further the communicati0n of 2 November 1956 of 
the Government of Hung.q_ry to  the Secretary-General asking the 
3ecurity Council "to instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Govern­
ments to s tart the negotiati ons immediately" on withdrawal 
of  Soviet force s ;  
Anxious t o  see the independence and s overeignty of 
Hunwary respected; 
1 .  Calls upon the Government of the U . S . S .R .  t o  desist 
f orthwith from any form of inte�vention,  particul�xly armed 
interventioa,  in  the internal affairs of Hungary ; 
2 .  Calls upon the u . s . s . R .  to  cease the i ntroduction 
of additi onal armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all 
of its forces without delay from Hung.qri�.n territory . 
3 .  Affirms the right of the Hungarian people to a 
government responsive to  its  nati onal aspirati ons and dedicated 
to its independence and well-being ; 
4 .  Requests the Secretary-General in c onsultation with 
the heads of appropriate specialized agencies  to explore on 
an urgent basis  the need of the Hungarian people for food , 
*Ibid . ,  p .  763 . 
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medicine dlnd other s i :n ilar supp l i e s  $:\nd t o  report t o  the 
Security C ounc i l  as s o on as p o s s i bl e ; 
5 .  Reques ts Rll Members of the United Nations and 
i n v i t e p  nati onal and internation�l humanitari�n organi z9 t i ons 
t o  c o-operate i n  making avail�ble such suppli e s  as may be 
required by the Hungarian peopl e .  
"Letter From Pres ident Eisenhower t o  Premier Bulganin , 
November 4"* 
I have noted with profound di stress the reports which 
have reached ne t oday from Hungary . 
·rhe Declarat i on of the Soviet Government of October J O ,  1956 , 
which restated the policy o f  non-intervent i on i n  internal affairs 
of other states , was generally understood ':1S promis ing the early 
wi thdraw�l of Soviet forces from Hungary . Indee d ,  in that st�te­
ment , the Soviet Union sa.id that " i t  considered the further 
presence of S ov i e t  Army uni ts in Hungary can serve as a C6'.us e  
f or &n even gre�ter deterioration of t h e  s i tuat i o n . "  Thi s  
pronounce�ent was regarded by the United States Government and 
myself as an act of high statesmanship. It was followed by the 
express request of the Hungari �.n Government for the withdrawal 
of S ov i e t  force s .  
Consequently , we have been inexpres sibly shocked by the 
apparent reversal of t h i s  pol i c y .  It i s  especially shocking 
that t h i s  renewed appli c a t i on o f  force against the Hungarian 
Government and people t o ok place while negotiations were 
g o ing on between your representatives and those of the Hungarian 
Government for the withdr�wal of Soviet forc e s .  
As you know , the Security Counc i l  of the U111 ted Nations 
h�s been engaged in an emergency examination of this prob l e m .  
As l a t e  a s  yes terday afternoon t h e  Council was l e d  to b e l i eve 
by your representative that the negot i R t i on s  then in progre s s  
i n  Budapest were leading to agreement which would result in 
the withdrawal of Soviet forc e s  from Hungary as requested by 
the government of th�t country . It was on that bas i s  that the 
Security Counc i l  recessed i t s  considerRtion of this matter. 
I urge i n  the na.me of humanity and in the cause of peace 
that the S ov i e t  Uni on take � c ti on to wi thdraw Soviet forces 
from Hungary immedia.tely and to permit the Hung�rian people 
to e n j oy and exer c i s e  the hum�n rights and fundamental freedoms 
a f f i rmed for �11 peoples in the Unit�d Nations Charter. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations is m e e t i ng 
i n  emergency s e s s i on this afternoon i n  New York t o  c onsider 
this tragic . s i tuat i o n .  It i s  m y  hope that your representative 
will be in .a pos i t i on to announce at the s e s s ion today that 
the Sov i e t  Union i s  prep�.ring t o  wi thdra.w i ts forc e s  from that 
c ountry and t o  allow the Hungarian people t o  enjoy the right 
to a government of their own choi c e . 
*Ibi d . , November 1 9 ,  1956 , p .  796 . 
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" Letter Frolli Premier Bulganin t o  t h e  Pre s ident , 
November 5 " *  
I n  t h i s  troubled and responsible moment f or t h e  cause of 
univ�rsal p e nc e ,  I approach you on behalf of the Soviet Govern­
l!lE:nt . One w e <=!k has passed already s i nc e  the armed forces of 
Bri t a i n ,  Franc e ,  and--obedient to the w i ll of extern�l forces-­
I s rael , w i t h out any rea.son attacked Egypt , bringing in t h e ir 
wake d e ·::ith ::lnd destruc t i o n .  Inhuman bombardment b y  t h e  
B r i t i s h  and French Air Forces against Egyptian a i r f i elds , 
ports , installat i ons , towns , and inha0ited l o c al i t i e s  i s  
taking pl ace . Anglo-French troops h�ve landed on Egyptian 
terri t ory . From the invaders ' fire tre�endous values created 
by the hands of the Egyptian people �re perishing and the toll 
o f  human life is mounting every day. 
An aggre s s i v e  war agai n s t  Egypt , against the Arab 
p e op l e s  wh o s e  s o l e  fault i s  that they upheld their freedom 
and independenc e ,  is unfolding b e f ore the e y e s  of the entire 
world, The s i tuation in Egypt calls f or inmediate and most 
res olute action on t h e  part of the U.N. Organizat i o n .  In 
the ev ent such ac t i on i s  not undert ake n ,  the U . N .  Organi zation 
w i l l  l o s e  its prestige in the eyes of mankind and w i l l  fall 
apart . 
The Soviet Union and the United Stat e s  � r e  permanent 
me ..a.bers of the Security Council and the two great p owers 
which p o s s e s s  all modern types of arms , including atomic and 
hydrogen weapons . We bear particular respons i b i l i t y  for 
s t opping war and reestabl i s hi ng peace and calm i n  the area of 
t h e  Near and Middle Eas t .  We are convinced that i f  the 
Governments of the u . s . s . R .  and the United States w i l l  f i r!ll y 
declare their will t o  i nsure peace Rnd oppose aggr e s s i o n ,  
t h e  aggr e s s i o n  w i l l  b e  put down and there w i l l  b e  n o  war. 
!"ir . Pre s ident , S1.t t h i s  threatening hour , when the 
l of t i e s t  1noral princ i p l e s  ::tnd the foundati ons and aims of the 
United Nations are being put t o  t h e  t e s t ,  the S ov i e t  Govern­
ment approaches the Government of the United States with 
a proposal of c l o s e  c o operati on 1n order to put f!n �nd to 
aggr e s s i on and to stop any further bloodshed . 
The United States h�s a strong n�vy i n  the zone of the 
Med i t erranean. The S o v i e t  Union a l s o  has a strong n�vy and a 
powerful air forc e .  The j oint and immediRte u s e  of these 
means by the United Stat e s  and the Soviet Uni on acc ording t o  
*Ibid . , p p .  796-797 .  
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a d e c i s L) n  '.)f the U n l  t�d N u t i ons would be a 1=;ure �uarG�r.;ty of 
ending the �l�gre s s i un a�ainst the :Sgyptian pe ople , a.gai�:i.st tr..e 
people of the ArGi.b East . 
The $ •.)Vi e t  G0Yer?1ment turns t o  t h e  U . S .  G ov ernment with 
an appeal to j o in their forces in the United Nati ons for 
the adoption of dec i s ive measures to put an end t o  the aggre s ­
s i on .  The Soviet Government has already turned t o  the Security 
Council Rnd the special extraordinary s e s s i on o f  the Gener1l 
As sembly with sui table proposal s .  Such j oint steps of the 
Uni ted States and the Soviet Uni on do not threaten the interests 
uf Brit�in �nd Franc e .  The popul�r m�s s e s  of 3ritain and France 
do not want war. They , like our people , desire t h e  �aintenance 
of peac e .  �any other states als o ,  together w i t h  Br i t a i n  and 
Franc e ,  �.re interested i n  the immediate pac i f 1 c & t i on :;nd 
re sumption of the normal fur.ct i oning of the Suez c�.nal ,  inter­
rupted by the mili tary oper�t i o n s . 
The aggres s i on aga inst Egypt has not been com,itted 
for the sake of free navig�tion al ong the Suez CanRl , which 
wa.s saf egu9_rded . The pir�tical war wa.s launched with the 
a i m  of restor i ng c o l onial order in the East , 8.n order w h i c h  
had been overt�rown by t h e  peopl e .  If this war i s  not stopped 
i t  carri e s  the daager of t urning into a third world war . 
If the Sovi e t  Union �nd the United St2.te s  w i l l  support 
the victi� of the �ggres s i o n ,  then other stat e s , members of 
the United Nati ons , w i l l  j oi n  us in these efforts . Ey t h i s  
tte authori t y  o f  t h e  United Nations w i l l  be c onslder�bly 
enhanced snd peace w i l l  be restored and s trenghtened. 
The Soviet Government i s  ready t o  enter into immediate 
negotiations with the Government of the United States on the 
practical re�li za t i o1� of the above-mentioned proposals , s o  
that effective act i on in the interests o f  peace �ight be 
undertaken w i thin tr.e next hour s .  
At this tense moment o f  h i s t ory , when the fate of the 
entire Arab East i s  b e i �g decided, and at the same t i me the 
fate of the world, I await your favorable reply . 
New York Times editorial "We Accuse" published on 
November 5 ,  1956* 
·,:e �ccus � th'"; So1.r i e t Government of murder. ".Ne accuse 
i t  0f tlie fo-vl s- s t; treacr1ery ;1nd the basest dece i t  kn•..)Wn t o  
m:.a.n. W e  accuse i t  o f  h!l.ving com::ii tted s o  moastrous a crime 
ag&.i.tist the Hungarian people yesterday that i t s  L'1f a.my Cl'l.n 
never be forgiven or forgotten . 
Lenin wrote i� 1900 : "The Czarist Gove rnment not only 
keeps our pe ople in slavery but sends it t o  suppre s s  other 
peoples ris i�g �g�inst their slavery ( as was done in 1849 
when Rus s i an troops pnt down the revoluti or. i n  Hunga:::-y ) . "  
How apt these words s ound today when we subst itute " S ov i e t "  
f o r  " Czar i s t , "  and 1956 for 1849 . 
H�tred and pity , mourning and ad".!llra t i o n ,  these �.re 
our emotions t od.�ly : h::itred for the men .sind the system 
which did not h e s i tate t o  shed new ri vers of inn�cent 
H1.ir1g,ari'ln blood t o  re i mpose $la.very ; p i ty for the Sovi et 
s oldiers , duped into thinking they were f ighting "FSoic i s t s "  
when th ey killed defenseless or nearly defens e l e s s  men, 
wome n ,  and children; mourni ng and admirat ion for the heroic 
Hun?_:aria:r .. people wh:) feared not even death t o  strike for free­
dom . 
Gone ;1ow are the last illusi OH S .  i>Ioscow now st:9.nds 
s e l f -exposed. The � orrent of Soviet bulle t s  yesterday did 
not kill only llungarJ ' s  freedom and Hungary ' s  martyrs . 
Those bulle t s  killed first of all the picture of a re f ormed , 
penitent Rus s i�- s e eki:n.g to repudiate Stalinism and pro.ct i c e  
c oexistence . C ould Stalin have acted more bar0arously -than 
d i d  h i s  succe s s ors ye ste rday ? Can we have any doubt now 
o f  what aw�i t s  us if we eve r  relax our vigilance and permit 
ourselves to bec ome prey to Soviet might , as was Hungary 
y esterday? 
The d a y  of infamy i s  ended .  The foul deed i s  done . 
The most herQic are dead . But the cause of freedom l i v e s  �nd 
i s  stronger than ever, nurtured by the blood of those who 
fell martyred in. freedom ' s  cause . The Hungari an people w i l l  
never forget . We s�all not forget .  And out of ha tred and 
t e ars i s  � orn the re solve t o  carry f orward the s truggle 
t i l l  freedom i s  tri u�phant . 
*New York Ti mes , Nove�ber 5 ,  1956 , p .  3 0 .  
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